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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM

APRIL 1967

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I. INTRODUCTION

It is a truism that the success of this Agency in meeting its responsibilities to the U.S. Government depends on the caliber and dedication of the Agency's employees. The importance of the role of the Career Training (CT) Program in supplying these employees cannot be overstressed. The CT Program, since it was founded in 1950, has entered on duty 1648 CTs, of whom 1144 were on duty at the end of December 1966. The purpose of the Inspector General's Survey of the Career Training Program in the Office of Training (OTR) is to evaluate in depth the effectiveness of the program in meeting the Agency's needs for selecting, training and placing junior professional officers.

This in-depth study of the CT Program is the first undertaken since a survey made in 1956 when the program was then only five years old. The 1956 survey stated that the Director of Training had done an excellent job of establishing the program and that the trainees had proven to be outstanding employees. Previous IG surveys which have touched on the CT Program are:

- a. CIA Career Service, 1959
- b. CIA Training Program, 1960
- c. Office of Personnel, 1964

This survey is limited to the CT Program, but since a major portion of OTR's training effort is spent on training CTs, we interviewed employees in most of the offices and staffs of OTR both in Headquarters and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This included interviews with all members of the CT Staff, heads of schools and faculties, many instructors, and with personnel concerned with processing and screening of applicants for the program in the Office of Medical Services, Office of Personnel and the Office of Security. We also visited recruiters in the field and talked with former recruiters.

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During the training phase of our survey we reviewed course objectives, schedules and syllabuses, sat through

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class lectures and seminar discussions in Headquarters and [REDACTED]. We also read critiques of courses prepared by instructors and CTs and reviewed various proposals to revise the content of some of the courses.

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We interviewed about 100 CTs and former CTs to get their reaction to training, placement and career development. This included interviews with CTs in the current training cycle, CTs attached to operating components for on-the-job training, and former CTs who have had significant experiences in the Directorates of Intelligence, Support and Plans.

To get management's reaction to the training of CTs and to the caliber of CTs provided by the CT Program, we interviewed senior officers in all of the directorates.

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II. SUMMARY

The CT Program since its beginning in 1950 has recruited, selected, trained and placed junior professional officers of high quality in all directorates and independent offices. As of January 1967 there were 824 CTs assigned to Agency components and an additional 320 in the training program. Many CTs have moved into senior Agency positions. The Clandestine Services has several [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Directorate of Intelligence has area, staff and division chiefs. In the Office of National Estimates four are GS-15 estimates officers. In the Directorate of Science and Technology one is an office director. Within the next five to ten years the movement of CTs into senior positions should proceed rapidly.

Senior operating officials in the Agency's components interviewed by the CT team, were almost unanimous in stating that they were pleased with the caliber and performance of CTs assigned to them. During our own interviews with CTs we, too, were impressed with their generally high caliber and motivation.

Of the four major elements of the CT Program--recruitment, selection, training and placement--the one most critical to the success of the program is selection. Selection is carried out in a highly commendable manner in the Office of Training by the CT Staff which selects CTs through file reviews and interviews with applicants in Headquarters. The CT Staff also performs well in placing CTs in operating components after they have finished their training.

Of the major CT Program elements, the one currently most in need of improvement is training. The training program is repetitive and much longer than necessary to meet the requirements of operating components. CTs being trained for the Directorates of Intelligence and Support are in training for five to six months. CTs being trained for the Clandestine [REDACTED]

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
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Although a good job is being done in the initial placement of CTs in the operating components, monitoring career development of CTs, particularly during their early work years in the Directorate of Intelligence and in the Clandestine Services, can be improved.

The original philosophy of the CT Program was to produce a small number of highly qualified young intelligence officers. That concept still prevails; however, the program has reached a stage in its development such that the original philosophy may no longer be appropriate. Enrollment in the program has expanded far beyond that of the early years, and there is a developing body of opinion that the CT Program should be the major source of young professionals to meet the future needs of the Agency.

As a result of the CT Staff's effective operation and its excellent working relationship with the Office of Personnel, whose recruiters do a good job of identifying candidates for the program, we believe that the CT Program should remain the responsibility of the Office of Training rather than be moved to the Office of Personnel, as has been considered in the past.

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III. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE CT PROGRAM

The Career Training (CT) Program, first known as the Junior Officer Training (JOT) Program, was established in the Office of Training in November 1950 to select, train and place in Agency components suitable young men and women for careers with CIA. Recruitment was made the responsibility of the Office of Personnel, which still retains this function. In 1965 the name of the program was changed to the Career Training Program.

General Walter Bedell Smith, DCI when the program was established, strongly influenced its original concept, which was to recruit and train junior career officers who would compose an "Elite Corps" for the eventual filling of top-level executive positions in the Agency. The "Elite Corps" concept created serious problems in personnel management. Many CTs thought of themselves as superior to other Agency professionals with resulting resentment on the part of other professionals and supervisors. In recent years the "Elite Corps" concept has been dropped. It is now recognized that many CTs will not get beyond mid-management positions. This has led to a healthier outlook by CTs and to a more ready acceptance of them throughout the Agency.

Until 1958 the CTs took some courses in common, but in general the training was by assignment of the individual CT to a specific course considered necessary to his career. In 1958 there was established a standard basic curriculum which would be required for all CTs.

The careful screening and selection process, basic to the original program, is still in effect. It results in mature trainees with diversified backgrounds. The average CT is in his mid to late 20s, has completed military service, and has a bachelor's or master's degree. About half

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Training today as in the early 1950s consists of formal training courses and on-the-job training. The total training period has increased appreciably over the training of the early 1950s. Today CTs headed for the Directorate of Intelligence and the Support Services are in training for five to six months; CTs for the Clandestine Services are trained for [REDACTED]. Throughout the history of the program, the Clandestine Services have taken the largest number of CTs. As of August 1955, there were 85 CTs in the Clandestine Services; 43 in the Directorate of Intelligence; and 11 in the Support Services. At the end of 1966 there were 593 CTs in the Clandestine Services; 140 in the Directorate of Intelligence; and 66 in the Support Services.

Today the CT Program is one of the major avenues of entering professional employees into the Agency. In 1966, 201 CTs began formal training. The CT Program now has a ceiling of 225 CTs per year plus an additional 50 per year for two years for assignment to [REDACTED]. This is in contrast to the early years of the program when only small numbers of CTs were recruited. For the first five years the average was about 45 per year and by the end of 1955 only 231 CTs had joined the Agency. The success of the program led to an increased ceiling, and by 1959 a total of 556 CTs had been recruited. By the end of 1966 there were 1144 CTs and former CTs in the Agency.

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Regulations

The basic authority for the operation of the Career Training Program is [REDACTED]. This regulation, last revised in November 1963, is currently undergoing revision. In general this regulation provides adequate authority to OTR and the participating directorates for the operation of the program.

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Based on cost figures provided by the Office of Training (OTR) and the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting, we believe that a reasonably accurate estimate of the cost of operating the CT Program in FY 1967 is \$6.3 million. OTR's total budget is [REDACTED]. In our cost estimate of \$6.3 million we have included CT salaries, CT interview and EOD travel, and salaries of the CT Staff, which total about \$2.8 million. Costs of recruiting, security and medical processing are about \$330 thousand. The prorated CT share of the \$4.4 million operating cost of the

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[REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]. This is based on OTR's estimate that about three-quarters of the [REDACTED] training effort is devoted to CTs. As a result, CT man-year cost of training is \$21,000. This is derived by dividing the total cost of the program by [REDACTED] estimated man years of CT training in FY 1967. Costs will remain comparable for FY 1968.

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We have not attempted to include in these estimates prorated costs of OTR management and other Headquarters costs, such as salaries of instructors in the Intelligence School, School of International Communism, and the Operations School and the travel and salaries of guest lecturers and instructors provided by operating components. Neither

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The training cycle of CTs preparing for the Clandestine Services has been extended [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This raises the cost of training a CT for the Clandestine Services from \$31,500 to a range of \$38,000 to \$40,000. This extension of training was at the direction of the DDP. It adds certain extra courses and language instruction to the existing training cycle. The Bureau of the Budget in informal discussions with the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting suggested that the Agency should absorb the additional cost incurred for language training under the proposed two-year cycle. We understand that OTR will continue

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as in the past to assign CTs to rolls of the Clandestine Services at the [REDACTED] and the Clandestine Services will absorb the cost of additional language training.

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Our concern during this survey has not been with the cost of the program but with the end product, namely the CT, and the effectiveness of the training. Our findings have shown that CTs by the end of their training, particularly those headed for the Clandestine Services, are suffering from training fatigue, and we have recommended in our section on Training that the program be shortened appreciably.

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C. CT Staff

The Career Training Staff is the administrative core of the Career Training (CT) Program. It consists of the chief, eight Program Officers, and five clerical employees. A Personnel Unit, attached to the staff, consists of two personnel officers, a personnel assistant and two clerical employees. In exercising its principal function, the selection of CTs for the program, the staff is doing extremely well. This is a reflection of the dedication and conscientiousness of the staff and its chief. The CT Program Officers spend about half of their time on the selection process as described in detail under the section on Selection.

Each Program Officer is also responsible for from 40 to 60 CTs who are in various stages of the training cycle. In carrying out this responsibility, Program Officers must perform the following functions:

- . Brief new CTs on the training program and their career in the Agency.
- . Arrange interim assignments for CTs who EOD before a class begins.
- . Arrange the 14 weeks of desk training for CTs being trained for the Clandestine Services.
- . Prepare biographic profiles of CTs to assist in placement.
- . Prepare over-all training evaluations of CTs.
- . Arrange trial attachments to operating components after formal training is completed.
- . Monitor progress of CTs during training and during their trial attachments prior to permanent assignment to a component.

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- . Maintain satisfactory working relationships with other elements of the Agency in processing and placing CTs.
- . Counsel CTs on careers.
- . Recommend CTs for promotions.
- . Handle problem cases which include cover problems, automobile accidents and poor performance in training.
- . Process internal applicants. One Program Officer spends most of his time in processing on-duty junior officers (internal) who apply for the program from within the Agency.

We determined the duties of the Program Officers from fitness reports and from personal interviews with all of the Program Officers. We also reviewed the Position Description U-885 for Program Officers. This statement, originally prepared in 1962 and updated in 1966, needs a complete revision. It contains material that is no longer accurate. It states, for example, that "Training is provided through utilization of CIA and other government schools, civilian colleges and universities and situational work assignments both within the U.S. and overseas." Assignments to non-CIA educational facilities and to overseas posts while in training are rare. The Position Description also refers to a function that no longer exists, the tailoring of separate training programs to meet the needs of individual CTs.

It is recommended that:

No. 1

*NO
PROBLEM*

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel to prepare an up-to-date Position Description to reflect accurately the current duties of the Program Officers.

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We believe that the Program Officers are performing most of their assigned functions in the same competent manner that they select CTs for the program. The one exception is counseling. Many CTs complained to us that there was too little counseling and the counseling they received was of poor caliber. Our research showed that CTs are not alone in their need for counseling or career guidance. Today, industry finds that guidance counseling is desired, needed and expected by its trainees not only in the training phase but also during the early years of work careers.

In reviewing the counseling program we found that one of the main reasons for inadequate counseling is the many administrative duties which the Program Officers must perform simply to keep the program operating. Individual Program Officers regard counseling as still theoretically a function of the CT Program, but in day to day operations they treat it as a luxury that they can spend little time on.

We see no easy solutions to improving the counseling or career guidance function, but we have several suggestions which may be helpful. These suggestions are directed at lightening the administrative load of the staff, in broadening the general Agency background of the staff, and in re-emphasizing the need for counseling.

To lighten the administrative workload, we suggest that the CT Staff consider streamlining its present procedure for placing CTs in the Directorate of Intelligence. Program Officers now deal directly with desk officers and administrative officers in OCI and other components of the Intelligence Directorate. This is extremely time consuming. The placement function would be more effective if Program Officers dealt only with the Administrative Staff of the DDI, which could then assume the responsibility of placing CTs in its components as well as ONE.

In our section on Training we recommend that the four-week Operations Familiarization Course be reduced

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and combined with an all-purpose familiarization course to be held in Headquarters. This would eliminate the obligation of the Program Officers [REDACTED] to counsel CTs during the running of the OFC. Because of transportation problems, these trips take at least two days, wasting one day in travel.

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Program Officers are also expected to remain in contact with CTs being trained for the Clandestine Services in the Operations Course and [REDACTED]. We believe that the workload of the Program Officers could be greatly lightened if the instructors at [REDACTED] were given more responsibility for counseling CTs. This would not come as a complete innovation, because each instructor is already responsible for counseling two CTs during their training [REDACTED]. The counseling, however, is limited to subjects related to the CTs' courses. This limitation on the instructors' counseling is a throwback to the early 1950s when CT training at [REDACTED] began and when the small number of CTs in the program permitted close contact between CTs and Program Officers even during the CTs' training at [REDACTED]. With the increased numbers of CTs, this close contact is no longer possible and we believe the instructors at [REDACTED] can help fill the gap between CT and Program Officer by playing a greater role in counseling. The instructors, however, will have to be briefed thoroughly by the CT Staff on the administrative details of the program so that they do not in their counseling inadvertently mislead CTs on placement and other important procedures.

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The counseling function would be greatly improved by the earlier identification of CTs for the directorate to which they will ultimately be assigned. We believe the CT Staff can accomplish this through information on the CTs already available to them. This information includes the CTs academic background, military and work experience, findings of the Assessment and Evaluation Staff, test scores, recruiter's interview, Program Officers' interviewing, personal contact since the CT joined the Agency, and the CT's personal inclination. Much of the CTs' dissatisfaction with counseling is a result of unanswered questions on their

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future assignments during the initial three months of training. It is not until this period is over, the end of the OFC, that the CT Staff and offices of operating components select the directorate for which the CT will be trained.

As mentioned earlier, the Program Officers, who range in age from 35 to 59 and in grade from GS-13 to GS-15, do extremely well in selecting candidates for the CT Program. But their capability to counsel on career guidance is limited by their Agency backgrounds which, on the whole, are not broad enough to permit discussions with CTs in depth on Agency operations. The Program Officers are weak in representation from intelligence production offices and from operating components of the Clandestine Services. Of the three Clandestine Services representatives, two have served only in Headquarters staff and service functions and the third has had no field experience since World War II. Of the three officers with backgrounds in the Directorate of Intelligence, only one has had experience in a production office. We believe the staff needs an infusion of Program Officers with recent intelligence production experience and field case officer experience. Such additions to the staff would be even more effective if an ex-CT with meaningful experience in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Clandestine Services could be included. There is a former CT serving on the CT Staff now, but his career in the Agency has been spent entirely in OTR.

The Chief of Operational Services in the Clandestine Services has recommended to the DDP the establishment on his staff of counselors for CTs and other professional officers. This would ease the counseling load of the Program Officers. To avoid conflict with the CT Staff, the counseling would have to be carefully coordinated with the CT's assigned Program Officer until the CT is permanently assigned to an operating component.

There is also evidence that one or two of the Program Officers are disinterested in counseling CTs. In addition to CTs who commented on this, one of the CT Program Officers told us that he felt CTs looked on the CT Staff

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as an administrative group not interested in career discussions with CTs. This attitude can be improved by increased emphasis placed on counseling.

It is recommended that:

No. 2

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training to improve CT counseling to include:

a. Placement of CTs for the Directorate of Intelligence through the Administrative Staff of that directorate.

b. Enlarging responsibility for counseling by instructors [REDACTED]

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c. Earlier identification of CTs to the directorate where they will ultimately be assigned.

d. Addition to CT Staff of former CTs with recent experience in operating components.

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██████████ states that "to be eligible for the Junior Officer Training Program a candidate must have a college education or, in the case of on-duty personnel, its equivalent in experience.... The candidate must also be qualified to undertake assignments of any degree of sensitivity and be medically qualified for full duty/general." Beyond this there are no specific written qualifications for a CT. In the search for high caliber junior officer personnel, certain general guidelines are followed, both at the Headquarters selection level and at the recruiter level where recommendations are made for candidates for the CT Program. The applicant must be of above average intellectual capacity with a good academic record in college, have a strong motivation for public service, and be flexible enough to adapt to the varying requirements of Agency service. It is preferred that the applicant has completed his military obligation, although in a limited number of cases military service may be sponsored by the Agency. There are no fixed age limits. Although the program is generally seeking candidates between 24 and 30 years of age, candidates at ages of 21 and 35 have entered the program.

Recruiters told us that they find these general guidelines to be adequate for recruiting CTs. Based on our personal observation of CTs during our interviews and on management's favorable reaction to CTs, we see no need for additional written requirements.

In quantity the CT Program is meeting the current Agency requirements for CTs. The quotas for FY 1965 and 1966 were as follows:

Clandestine Services	90
Support Services	55
Directorate of Intelligence	55
Directorate of Science and Technology	10
Office of the Director	10
Contingencies and Attrition	5
Total	<u>225</u>

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Assignments to directorates fluctuate somewhat from class to class, but in any given year directorates usually receive their quotas. In FY 1965, 218 CTs entered on duty; and in FY 1966, 210 entered on duty. The FY 1967 and FY 1968 quotas have been established at 275 for these two years with 50 CTs earmarked each year for the [REDACTED] Program. The Chief of the CT Staff expects to meet the FY 1967 quotas, but because of the decreased numbers of applicant files received from July to December 1966, he is worried about FY 1968.

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It should be emphasized that the quota of 225 CTs per year is only adequate to meet current requirements. The 225 quota was increased from 150 in 1964 as a result of the identification by the Office of Personnel of the "valley after the hump" which will occur in the 1970s when many officers now in their 50s will retire under existing Agency policy. But as CTs have been recruited and trained under the new quota, operating components have used them as replacements to fill vacancies created by the departure of professional employees. Thus the increased quota is having little impact on the personnel shortage anticipated for the 1970s.

Even with a greatly increased quota for CTs, the CT Program will not enter on duty the majority of professional employees in any given year. Other channels for specialists and junior professionals will have to be used. In Calendar Year 1966, for example, [REDACTED] professionals who entered on duty were CTs. Of the [REDACTED] many were professionals in categories normally not considered for the CT Program. Some were technicians and scientists for NPIC and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Others were junior analysts for OCR and Records Integration Division.

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CTs enter the Agency via the following three prime channels:

- a. Field recruiters
- b. Internal Agency applicants
- c. Write-ins, Agency referrals, walk-ins

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In the October 1966 class of 75 CTs, there were 16 internal candidates, 49 CTs from recruiters, and ten write-ins or Agency referrals.

As with the class of October 1966, recruiters usually account for 50% to 60% of the CTs in any given class. It is our view that the 17 recruiters, who range in grade from GS-12 to GS-15, are doing an excellent job of recruiting for the CT Program. It should be noted that recruiters spend only 20% of their time in recruiting CTs. They also recruit clerical help, communications employees, scientists, economists, and professionals for other Agency components.

We heard criticisms in Headquarters that many field recruiters lack Agency experience other than recruiting. As a result, they are unable to discuss with authority the workings of the Agency with applicants. Also, this line of criticism continues, recruiters become frustrated because they do not understand the time involved in processing applicant files in Headquarters.

It is true that most recruiters have limited Agency experience. Several of them entered on duty in 1951 and have been assigned only to recruiting since then. But we are not convinced that this seriously detracts from their effectiveness as recruiters. It might be useful for the recruiters to have a broader knowledge of the Agency, but we do not consider it essential to the success of their efforts. The usual campus interview is limited to one-half hour, just time to allow the recruiter to give a minimal statement about the Agency, to explain the filling in of forms, and to chat briefly with the applicant. Non-campus interviews follow a similar pattern. Thus, broader knowledge of intelligence would not necessarily improve recruiting techniques, but it could contribute to higher morale for the recruiters.

Since high morale is important to their recruitment approach, we discuss below some ideas for broadening the recruiters' scope and for keeping them current with Headquarters developments. We also find there is a need to keep recruiters up to date on personnel procedures and the

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mechanics of paper handling, so that they will be aware of the time element and other factors affecting applicant processing.

Through the years the recruiter's only regular contact with Headquarters has been at the annual recruiters' conference which is devoted mainly to repetitious discussions of personnel requirements. There have been occasional training courses attended by recruiters, and in 1963 there was an effort to expose recruiters to Headquarters training. Seven recruiters who are still in the field took Intelligence Orientation, a course designed to introduce new employees to the Agency and hardly appropriate for employees who at that time had been on duty for over ten years. A more appropriate course today would be Intelligence Review. Other courses taken by recruiters have tended to be localized in the support area in courses such as personnel management.

We believe that the best approach to familiarizing field recruiters with Agency intelligence activity is to give them periodic Headquarters training. Several weeks of work experience, similar to the program initiated by the Office of Personnel in the summer of 1966 when three field recruiters were brought to Headquarters to observe personnel operations, will provide the necessary up-dating on administrative procedures.

We also believe that selected recruiters would benefit from participation in the Mid-Career Executive Development Program.

It is recommended that:

No. 3

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel to:

- a. Periodically bring field recruiters to Headquarters to expose them to meaningful training and work experience.
- b. Consider recruiters for selection to the Mid-Career Executive Development Program.

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The IG Survey of the Office of Personnel in 1964 pointed out that there was a wide difference in what recruiters tell applicants about CIA. The survey recommended that the Director of Personnel develop a current, factual and interesting statement to be used by recruiters in describing CIA to applicants. The DDS concurred in October 1964. As nearly as we could determine, such a statement does not exist today. Based on our interviews of CTs in the last two classes and with recruiters, we believe there is still a need for a statement not only to describe the Agency but also the CT Program.

It is recommended that:

No. 4

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel and the Director of Training to prepare and maintain an up-to-date description of the Agency and the CT Program for use by recruiters.

Since the beginning of the CT Program in 1951, the Office of Training and the Office of Personnel have used imaginative techniques for recruiting CTs. In 1966 advertisements were run in about 50 daily newspapers. This program has not been fully evaluated, but 200 replies were received from the ads that appeared in the New York Times. During our survey we interviewed several CTs whose first contact with the Agency was through answering these ads.

In 1963 the Office of Personnel initiated a "100 Universities" program which sponsored high level Agency speakers to address selected members of university faculties. In its first year 105 universities were visited. Since then the number has declined and present thinking is that a saturation point may have been reached and further campus visits may not be necessary for a few years.

Another program which is still operating is that of the University Associates, which began in 1951 and now has 28 university administrators and faculty members.

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The program is not a strong arm of recruitment but sometimes helps in supporting Agency programs at university campuses. The only compensation of the associates is \$50 a day while in Headquarters three days each November when they attend the University Associates Conference. Some typical comments of Headquarters personnel, recruiters and former recruiters are: "Spotty some no good at all concept was sound but through the years the quality has deteriorated....needs culling out....role needs redefining."

It is recommended that:

No. 5

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel and the Director of Training to:

- a. Review the role of the university consultants to determine if the program is worth maintaining.
- b. Clarify objectives, cull out marginal consultants and appoint new consultants after adequate indoctrination if the program is to be continued.

The relationship between the recruiters and the CT Staff members a few years ago was distant. Today, as a result of joint Office of Personnel and OTR attention, the relationship is excellent. At the annual recruiters conference in September 1966, for example, recruiters and CT Program Officers spent time together [REDACTED] discussing mutual problems. Additionally, recruiters participated in CT Program Officers' interviews with applicants.

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We noted a lack of information in Recruitment Division on the makeup of CT classes. This kind of information would be helpful to the management of Recruitment Division, as well as to the recruiters, who told us it would assist them in their recruitment efforts. This information already exists in the CT Staff in the form of profile data on each CT.

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It is recommended that:No. 6

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel to obtain from the Director of Training the CT class profile data and to make this information available to the field recruiters.

Recruiters, in their efforts to recruit CTs from a wide variety of universities, visit some 400 different campuses a year. The result of their diligence is shown in the October 1966 CT class, which had CTs from 28 home states and 80 colleges and universities. There is a possibility, however, that in their efforts to get wide geographic representation among applicants, they are becoming too thinly spread.

Recruiters from private enterprise have a similar problem, and the director of placement at a major U.S. university stated that recruiters would do better by concentrating on fewer campuses. We feel that, with limitations on field recruitment personnel, concentration of effort on campuses with large CT applicant potential is more efficient than trying to cover many campuses. This would permit the recruiter to become better acquainted with a smaller number of universities, so that in addition to knowing placement officers he could develop contacts with department heads and senior professors. We recognize, however, that recruiters spend only 20% of their time interviewing for CTs and have requirements for other employees which require their visiting smaller campuses. We are, therefore, not recommending that recruiters concentrate only on large campuses, but we do feel that these campuses are probably the best source for CTs, and the Director of Personnel, when planning recruiters' schedules, might consider this factor.

We also heard objections to recruiters spending too much time on undergraduate campuses. This has the drawback of attracting young men who lack military training and are, therefore, not desirable for the CT Program. We believe that concentration of effort would

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be more productive at the graduate school level, at Veterans Administration offices and, where it can be arranged, military discharge centers.

Recruiters are encouraged to look for qualified Negroes. Major Negro colleges such as Howard and Tuskegee are visited, but experience shows that these universities are not apt to produce CT material. The large non-segregated state universities are more productive. To date the CT Program has had a total of 16 Negroes. Recruiters also are on the lookout for Orientals. One of the problems here is that Orientals are a small minority group and there are simply not enough of them to meet the demand. The July 1966 class had one Japanese-American, who had a master's degree in Asian Studies from the University of Southern California.

In 1961 the DDCI approved a memorandum from the Director of Personnel recommending that as a guide for advancing CTs, the Agency should adopt a standard but not automatic rate of promotion so that CTs would be promoted from GS-7 to GS-11 in about 3-1/2 years. During the year after the memorandum was disseminated, at least in the Clandestine Services, promotion of CTs to GS-11 in three to 3-1/2 years was considered to be virtually automatic. But during the next few years as budgetary restrictions were felt, it became impossible to follow this policy.

An examination of the Personnel Status Report for CTs confirms that all CTs are not promoted to GS-11 in three to 3-1/2 years. In some cases they have advanced to GS-11 in less than that time; but in the Clandestine Services, for example, about 30% of GS-10s on duty as of 31 December 1966 had been with the Agency 3-1/2 years or longer. However, if the time on duty is extended to four years, there is an immediate drop in the percentage figure, for only about 5% of those on duty four years are still at the GS-10 level.

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As a result of the policy expressed in the 1961 memo, former CTs in the Clandestine Services are complaining about not being promoted according to the 1961 policy, and some have resigned because of this. Another problem is that some recruiters and Headquarters personnel are still referring to the GS-7 to -11 in 3 to 3-1/2 years. The CT Staff in its pre-employment interviews disabuses the applicant of this notion, but even a brief exposure to this can be harmful. CTs are now told they will receive their first promotion about seven months after beginning their training if their performance is satisfactory but that later promotions will depend on their performance as related to other professional employees in the component where they are permanently assigned.

It is recommended that:

No. 7

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel to caution recruiters against discussing promotion policies for CTs except for the first promotion, which comes seven months after the beginning of formal training.

We are not opposed to promotion to GS-11 in the 3-1/2 year period, but we are opposed to having commitments made to applicants that are not kept. The CTs we have interviewed feel that the GS-11 provides an adequate subsistence wage for the married man with children. We agree with this attitude and think that every effort should be made to protect our investment in the CTs by arriving at GS-11 in a reasonable time period.

Competition for capable young men and women is increasing. We could find no agreement in the Office of Personnel and the Office of Training on how competitive the Agency is with other government agencies and private industry for recruiting trainees. There appears, however, to be a recruiting problem developing rapidly, based on our entering salaries, and we believe there is justification for increasing these salaries.

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The CT applicant is not interested in a business career. He shares the views of most of his contemporaries, only 31% of whom, according to an October 1966 article in Newsweek, were considering a career in business. He volunteers for CIA seeking challenge, responsibility and an opportunity for public service. He is not after a large salary, but he must meet certain minimum financial requirements to support himself and his family. This presents a problem because the Agency's beginning salaries are somewhat below industry and government. In 1967, for example, average salaries for graduates with a BA degree in liberal arts entering management training in industry will average about \$6700 per year, roughly the equivalent of the second step of a GS-7. Eleven of the CTs in the class of October 1966 were GS-7s. Management trainees with master's degrees will receive about \$8400. This is the equivalent of a Step 4 of a GS-9.

In comparing our starting salaries with industry's, it should be remembered that CTs are not recent college graduates. Most of them have completed military service and many have had significant work experience. CTs, therefore, should not be equated with recent college graduates for salary consideration.

For applicants with BA's, the Agency is roughly competitive with other government agencies which starts BA's who finish in the upper quarter of their class as GS-7s. The CT Staff takes into consideration the maturity of Agency applicants and starts most of them as GS-8s.

In another important category, however, the Agency is not always competitive with the rest of the government. Although some other government agencies hire applicants with master's degrees as GS-9s if they are in the upper quarter of their class, the Agency usually starts them as GS-8s. The Agency does start a few applicants with master's degrees as GS-9s, but this leads to morale problems. One CT, hired as a GS-8, who had served several years as a military officer and had a master's degree in political science and all his course work completed for a PhD,

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said that some of his classmates who started as GS-9s had backgrounds similar to his.

The Foreign Service hires its Junior Foreign Service Officers at the equivalent of a GS-7, and promotions in the lower grades occur at a slower rate than CTs.

The Agency hires applicants with law degrees at about the same salary levels as it hires applicants with master's degrees. In the October 1966 class, of three CTs with LL.B.'s, one was a GS-8 and two were GS-9s. The FBI, on the other hand, starts its new agents, most of whom have law degrees or degrees in accounting, as GS-10s.

The fact that CTs are promoted within about seven months after formal training begins does not alter the weakness in the Agency's hiring pattern. This is because CTs may enter on duty up to four months before training begins and their time in grade for promotion counts only after they begin formal training. Hence, a CT could be in grade up to 11 months before receiving his first promotion. He is then promoted under Agency policy on the GS-8, GS-9, GS-10 schedule. Most other federal agencies do not use these intermediate grades in the promotion of professional personnel.

During our survey various proposals were being considered to increase starting salaries for all CTs. One of these proposals, which appears to have merit, is to start CTs with BAs in Step 4 of a GS-7 and CTs with MAs in Step 4 of a GS-9. We realize that raising CT salaries would have an impact on the budget of the CT Program. Another obstacle to carrying out such a proposal is the reluctance of the Clandestine Services to accept CTs at higher grade levels than they now receive them. OTR, therefore, finds itself in a squeeze between competition and Clandestine Services policy.

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The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel to review the present standards for determining starting salaries for CTs and to consider recommending raising these salaries to meet competition from other government agencies and industry.

We believe that another deterrent to recruiting is the length of the training program, which ranges from five to six months for CTs entering the Directorate of Intelligence and the Support Services, [REDACTED] for CTs entering the Clandestine Services. The increasing rate of declines and increasing numbers of applicants who do not return forms to the recruiters may well be a result of their reluctance to enter a long training program.

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The CT Program is not only in competition with industry and other government agencies for capable young trainees; it is also in competition with other Agency components. ORR, for example, is seeking young economists, for direct hire. The Clandestine Services have a lateral entry program; a records integration program; and various programs for contract employees. Partly because of this competition, applicant files forwarded to the CT Staff dropped from a monthly average of 94.6 in FY 1966 to an average of 67.5 in FY 1967. At this rate, the October 1967 and later classes would not be filled. In early 1967, as a result of meetings among representatives of the Support Services concerned with recruitment, additional files were channeled to the CT Staff.

The Office of Personnel, however, is not at all certain that it can continue to provide the CT Staff with the numbers of files it needs to fill the quota for the October 1967 class. (The July 1967 class, based on applicants in process, will probably reach its quota of about 90 CTs.)

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The recruitment of internals has not been aggressively pushed by the management of the various components of the Agency. Since 1963 about 90% of the applicants have been self-referrals rather than persons recruited through supervisory recommendations based on a high level of on-the-job performance.

Under Selection we discuss the favorable aspects of the selection of CTs from among on-duty personnel, but there are certain distinctly unfavorable aspects. The system of self-referrals results frequently in an unhappy situation where the applicant is acceptable to the CT Program but is not made available by the employing component in a reasonable time. In other cases when component chiefs have recommended candidates to the CT Program, they have done so to solve personnel problems. Examples of such misuse are: solving placement problems of the returnee with no assignment; rewarding a good work-horse type; circumventing the problem of being over T/O strength; and training secretaries who want to become professionals who might not otherwise be promoted.

Internal CTs have been recruited from every major Agency component. The greatest single source is Records Integration Division (RID), where many "direct hires" have been assigned because the candidate needed greater maturity. RID is now being utilized as a proving ground for future CTs. The next biggest single source has been OCR. A fair number have been recruited from [REDACTED] contract personnel who have demonstrated acceptability through performance in Vietnam, Laos or elsewhere.

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The consensus of senior officers and of supervisors of internal CTs is that they are not of the same high caliber as externals. In general, they are evaluated as lacking the qualities of spark, imagination, poise, ingenuity, or mental capacity. They perform well but are not considered to have the potential of external CTs. We believe that the lower quality of internal CTs may well result from the fact that the large majority of candidates apply on their own initiative seeking escape or betterment rather than being top

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employees selected and recommended by supervisors. We think that the caliber of internals would be improved if the supervisors were more active in recommending qualified personnel for consideration as participants in the CT Program.

Over the years the percentage of internals in the program has averaged about 22%. We believe that 15% to 20% is a reasonable mix that will provide a given class with some but not too many CTs experienced with varied facets of Agency procedure.

It is recommended that:

No. 9

a. The Deputy Director for Support amend [REDACTED] to include a statement in the following vein: Supervisors are urged to recommend as applicants to the CT Program employees who meet the qualifying requirements and who have demonstrated by their on-duty performance that they are the types of persons suited for the CT Program.

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b. The Deputy Director for Support issue annually a notice directing the attention of supervisors to the above provision of [REDACTED].

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From its inception the CT Program has sponsored military duty for candidates who have not fulfilled this obligation and whose services would probably be lost to the Agency unless a legitimate mechanism were in existence to provide appropriate military training for outstanding men subject to loss to the draft. Thus there have been developed four service programs sponsored by the Agency in cooperation with the parent service. These programs are the Air Force Officer Training School, the Army OCS, the Marine Officer Candidate Course, and the Army ROTC. The quotas are 28 per fiscal year for the Air Force, 15 for the Army OCS, and "as-can-be-arranged" for the Marines and Army ROTC. As of February 1967, there were 41 CTs in the various programs. A noteworthy

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feature of the programs is the arrangement with the Services to detail the CT candidate back to the Agency for the last 12 to 24 months of his active duty status.

The military programs have been subject to criticism because of the high attrition rate among CTs after completion of their military obligation. Current or even recent figures are not available from either the Office of Personnel or the Office of Training; but of the 158 CTs whose military service was sponsored in the first ten years of the program, only 60 were on duty as of 31 December 1966, an attrition of 68 per cent. In view of previous criticisms of the value of the military program and because it is administratively time-consuming and cumbersome, we are disturbed by the unavailability of data to evaluate the worth of this program over the last five years.

Despite this high attrition factor, we believe that Agency sponsorship of military duty for highly qualified CT candidates is a valuable method of obtaining competent men who would otherwise be lost to the Agency. For in spite of the increased number of academically qualified men who have completed military service, it is currently necessary to utilize the military program quotas to meet the personnel requirements of the CT Program.

It is recommended that:

No. 10

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training with the Director of Personnel to maintain up-to-date statistics on CTs whose military service has been sponsored by the Agency so that military programs can be properly evaluated.

One of our major problems in recruiting is the lag between the time the recruiter first sees an applicant and when the applicant is notified of the Agency's interest. Prompt follow-up is needed to retain the interest of the applicant, who has probably had several interviews in the same period. The Director of Placement at M.I.T. considers

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a satisfactory period between on-campus interview and notice of company reaction to be 7 to 10 days. DePont, using teletype and other mechanized procedures, guarantees reaction within 48 hours.

CIA's performance in this area is poor. The Agency's normal time from interview to forwarding a letter indicating interest is at least 30 calendar days. It is difficult to weigh precisely the impact of this waiting period on an applicant, but CT Program records show that in FY 1966, 42 applicants declined during this period. Probably of greater importance is the added time that this initial processing adds to the total processing of an applicant which now takes six months and over. During FY 1966, 268 applicants declined. The CT Staff has ample evidence accumulated through the years that the slowness of Agency processing is one of the major factors contributing to applicants who accept other positions rather than wait.

Following is the processing record of a typical applicant file:

Applicant interview in the field	14 May 66
Recruiter forwarded papers	28 Jun 66
Recruitment Division Hqs. processing	1-8 Jul 66
Correspondence Section, Placement Division acknowledged receipt of application to applicant	11 Jul 66
CT Staff received file	14 Jul 66
Application placed in process (Security and Medical)	21 Jul 66
Correspondence Section forwarded letter to applicant expressing interest	26 Jul 66

Note:

1. The recruiter does not forward his file to Headquarters until receiving completed forms

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and academic records from the applicant. In this case the applicant delayed sending his forms from 14 May to 28 June.

2. The Correspondence Section does not forward the letter to the applicant expressing Agency interest until the CT Staff has screened the application file and decided the applicant is CT material.

We noted other cases that took up to three months before the applicant was informed of Agency interest. Some of this was due to the Placement Branch's forwarding files originally recommended by the recruiter for the CT Program to other components. In some cases the components held onto the file for over a month only to return the file to Placement Branch with an expression of no interest.

The Skills Bank put into effect in the fall of 1966 by the Placement Branch should reduce the delays in processing previously experienced when files were shopped to Agency components. Under the Skills Bank system files for the CT Program are supposed to be forwarded directly to the CT Staff. Files placed in the Skills Bank remain there for two weeks for examination by personnel representatives from other operating components. But even with the Skills Bank operating successfully, the CIA system for processing files needs revision. This can only be accomplished through tighter control, constant monitoring and by a vigorous and imaginative approach to devising means of short-cutting existing methods. Some of these short cuts might involve:

- a. Placing more reliance on the recruiter's interview by the CT Staff rather than waiting until the complete file of A&E tests, etc., are available.
- b. Having the recruiter's material go directly to the CT Staff rather than following the existing

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pattern, which is:

(1) Recruiter's file to Recruitment Division in Ames Building

(2) Recruitment Division to Placement Division at Langley

(3) Placement Division to Records Control Division

(4) Then to CT Staff at 1000 Glebe

c. Reducing processing time in Placement Division, Records and Control Division, and CT Staff. Files often rest in Placement Division and Records and Control Division several days. The average time for reaching a decision on whether or not an applicant is desirable in the CT Staff was 21 calendar days in 1966. The CT Staff is taking steps to reduce this time.

It is recommended that:

No. 11

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Directors of Personnel, Training, Medical Services and Security jointly to review the processing of CT applicants and to submit their recommendations to him for reducing processing time.

Assigning a correspondence clerk to the personnel section of the CT Staff to send letters to applicants informing them of receipt of application and of Agency interest would help eliminate delays in processing.

It is recommended that:

No. 12

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Personnel to consider assigning a correspondence clerk from the Records Control Division to the Personnel Section which is attached to the CT Staff to facilitate correspondence with CTs.

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E. Screening and Selection

In the past, arguments have been advanced to move the CT Program to the Office of Personnel. This is based on the assumption that selecting, training and placing CTs are personnel functions similar to recruiting for the CT Program, which is carried out by the Office of Personnel. Our interviews with officials of operating components, who expressed satisfaction with the caliber of CTs they receive, and our reviews of CT performance after leaving OTR show that the selection process in OTR has worked out extremely well. We see little advantage to moving the program to the Office of Personnel where it would probably be diluted with other personnel programs. We believe, therefore, that the CT Program best meets the needs of the Agency in its present position in the Office of Training where it has been located since the establishment of the program in 1950.

At times criticism has centered on the method of selecting CTs. In 1960, for example, the IG Survey of Agency training suggested that the CT Staff might be assuming "excessive responsibilities" in selecting CTs and recommended that the Director of Training establish a selection panel composed of line officers from the three directorates with representatives from the Office of Personnel, OTR, and Chief, CT Staff. The DDS agreed with this recommendation. In practice, however, it was too unwieldy to have a formal panel, as such, operate with any degree of efficiency without disrupting the mechanics of pre-employment interviews, now running over 500 per year. The Director of Training, in an effort to comply with the spirit of the recommendation, succeeded in acquiring representatives from the Directorate of Intelligence and the Clandestine Services to serve on the CT Staff. This has been the practice to date.

Even with representatives from the Clandestine Services on the CT Staff participating in the selection process, the DDP has not always been satisfied with the method of selecting CTs, and from time to time the

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Clandestine Services has inserted itself in the selection process. In the spring of 1966, for example, the Director of Training, responding to a request from the DDP's Training Officer, agreed to alert the Training Officer when CT applicants were scheduled to visit Headquarters. The Training Officer then arranged to have senior officials from the Clandestine Services participate in interviewing applicants with CT Program Officers. This procedure proved to be unwieldy and was generally unsatisfactory to both the Clandestine Services and the Office of Training. It was abandoned after a brief trial period.

Another screening procedure, developed by the Clandestine Services in April 1966, is a panel that interviews CTs after they have completed the first portion of their training. The purpose of the screening is to determine CT suitability for the Clandestine Services. We discuss this panel in more detail in our section on Placement.

Another common criticism of the CT Program of a few years ago was that there were too many CTs from Eastern universities. It is true that during the first several years of the CT Program Ivy League universities contributed many CTs. From 1951 to 1958 the percentage was 20%. There were several reasons for this. Traditionally, students from Eastern universities had more interest in foreign affairs and government service than students in other sections of the country. Also, the faculty and administration of these universities were more receptive to Agency recruiters and other representatives than universities in other sections.

Criticism of this aspect of the CT Program was formalized in 1956 when the IG survey of the program emphasized the need to recruit candidates from sections of the United States other than the East. Since then the percentage of Ivy League graduates has steadily declined. This is the result of several factors including the increased interest in foreign affairs and in government service outside the East and the increased nationwide coverage by Agency recruiters. Of the 370 CTs who entered the Agency from

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the March 1965 class through the October 1966 class, only 7% were from Ivy League universities. Eighty different educational institutions were represented including well-known colleges and universities such as the University of Wisconsin and Stanford University, and lesser known ones such as Iona College and Central Missouri State College. It is not unusual to have graduates of the Military Academy and the Naval Academy.

The educational backgrounds of the Agency's CTs are much more varied than that of the young Foreign Service Officer. From 1957 to 1962, one-third of the 926 officers appointed to the Foreign Service came from ten universities. Four of them were Ivy League schools. The others were California, Stanford, Georgetown, Colorado, Michigan and Minnesota.

The first step in the Headquarters process of selecting CTs is the review of applicant files by the CT Program Officers. The Program Officers are assisted by the CT Program Personnel Branch in this file review. The Personnel Branch has two professional personnel officers who technically belong to the Placement Division of the Office of Personnel, but they are physically attached to the CT Program. The personnel officers and the CT Program Officers work together in a highly effective manner.

To fill the Agency's requirements for CTs, the CT Staff must spend a large amount of its time in screening files and interviewing CTs to meet the quotas for CT classes. In FY 1966 the staff reviewed 1106 files, including files from recruiters and internal Agency candidates, and held 543 interviews to get 140 CTs entered on duty. (During the initial file review, 42 applicants declined and 211 were rejected. During the remaining phases of screening, 550 personnel actions were canceled as a result of applicants declining and because of medical and security rejects.)

As mentioned in the section on Recruitment, the applicant is not informed of Agency interest until the CT Staff has decided, after reviewing the applicant's file,

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that he appears to have appropriate qualifications for the CT Program. The first step in the file review is made by the personnel officers assigned to the staff from the Office of Personnel. This review eliminates about 10% of the files because of routine disqualifying factors, previously unnoticed, such as close foreign relatives and recent Peace Corps experience.

The file is then forwarded to one of the Program Officers on the CT Staff who usually has the following background material to assist him in his review:

- a. Recruiter's interview report
- b. Applicant's PHS form
- c. Transcript of academic records
- d. Test results
- e. Comment from CT personnel officer
- f. Medical history

In reaching his decision the CT Program Officer has no written requirements to assist him beyond [REDACTED], which specifies only that an applicant must have a college education and be medically qualified. What he does have is a body of experience from which to draw, accumulated during the 15 years that the CT Program has been in existence. Although there are no minimum language or military requirements, applicants with military service and language skills are preferred. In practice, most CTs have performed military service before joining the Agency. In the absence of specific requirements, the Program Officer looks for such things as capacity for hard work, significant military service, and the applicant's ability to project his personality.


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After completing his file review, the Program Officer decides to begin the processing of the applicant

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or to reject him. If the decision is to begin processing, clearance for pre-employment interview is requested from the Office of Security, and the letter informing the applicant of Agency interest is forwarded.



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The test results show that CTs normally place in the top 10% of the population of the United States in mental

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aptitude and well above the average of other Agency professional employees. In the last few years the A&E Staff has noticed a slight drop in test scores of applicants accepted by the Agency, but the psychologists do not interpret this as an indicator of an over-all drop in CT quality.

The A&E Staff does not know how accurate the test results and A&E's interpretation of them are in predicting job performance. The staff expressed a concern that the CT Staff might be placing undue reliance on the A&E interpretation of the test results. We do not believe that A&E needs to be concerned because Program Officers look on the test results as only one of several tools in reaching a decision on an applicant's suitability for the CT Program. There are indications, however, that the Clandestine Services panel that interviews CTs after they are in training for suitability for the Clandestine Services may be overemphasizing test results.

Until mid-1963, all CTs were psychologically assessed by the A&E Staff after the CTs entered on duty. This assessment, based on personal interviews, lasted for two days and was aimed at helping with assignments. As a result of the increased size of CT classes, this type of assessment was discontinued as a general practice except for internal candidates who are seen for a day.

All CTs are seen by Agency or contract psychiatrists. The psychiatric interview is based on a personnel index form, filled out by the CT. The interview itself takes about one hour. (In Calendar Year 1966, 546 applicants were interviewed.) The objective of the interview is to determine emotional suitability for Agency employment. If an applicant is rejected because of psychiatric reasons, the Chief of the CT Staff may request a waiver from the DDS.

Relations between the CT Staff and OMS are excellent. When doctors in OMS have reservations about an applicant, they frequently discuss the problem with the Chief of the CT Staff before making their formal recommendation.

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Selection of a CT from on-duty personnel is based on a more thorough screening evaluation than for an external. First, discussion with the applicant is not inhibited by security restrictions. Second, the record of the applicant's performance is available. Third, queries about the applicant can be made of his supervisor and co-workers to determine their evaluation of suitability. Fourth, more time is devoted to assessment, including a full hour with the A&E psychologist. Finally, there is better opportunity for personal interview by the CT Program Officers. In the case of CTs applying from the Clandestine Services, there is the additional pre-selection procedure established by the Clandestine Services Selection Board for CTs. The ratio of selection of CTs from internal applicants is higher (one out of every three applicants) than for externals (about one out of eight). This higher ratio is due in part to preliminary screening which eliminates some candidates before they become formal applicants.

The majority of CTs major in political science, history, internal relations, area studies and languages, but each class usually has English, psychology, law or journalism majors. With the broadening of the program to meet requirements of the four directorates, CTs with majors in business administration, engineering and mathematics are increasing. Of the 75 CTs in the October 1966 class, 22 had graduate degrees, mostly master's.

In 1966 the average CT was 26 years old and almost half were married. The average grade of the October 1966

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class was GS-8. About 90% of the male CTs had completed military service ranging from a few months to several years of active duty, including service in South Vietnam. Military service can be enlisted or commissioned. About 8% of an average class is female.

In addition to military and academic experience, about half of the CTs in any class will have had significant work experience. In the class of October 1966, 20 different fields of endeavor were represented including: accounting, insurance, sales, engineering, teaching, advertising, radio/TV, manufacturing and missionary work.

The A&E Staff made a study in 1964 of personality characteristics of 214 male CTs who entered on duty in 1961, 1962 and 1963. CT characteristics were compared with non-Agency groups who had taken similar tests. The study, later updated through July 1965, showed that the average CT is an activist. He scores highest on dominance. His lowest score is on femininity, the same as military officers. He is aggressive, confident, self-reliant and has strong initiative. He has greater leadership potential than business executives. The group from which the CT differs most is the beatnik.

A senior officer in the Clandestine Services who has closely observed a cross section of CTs during the past year describes them as representing a high average input. In their political thinking he considers them in the middle of the road.

The team took a random sample of ex-CTs who are now on duty at the GS-12 level and reviewed their files to see if there were a correlation between background and on-job performance. We considered age at EOD, college or colleges attended, major academic fields, class standing, honors received, scholarships, own contribution to college expenses, environment and geographic area lived in, training record, A&E record, promotion progress, interim and permanent assignment, military experience, and language qualification. Analysis of these factors

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did not develop a pattern which would permit us to state that firm prediction could be made about the potential success, failure, or mediocrity of any given individual of certain qualifications as opposed to another with different qualifications. The file review did establish that the quality of the personnel entering the Agency as CTs is high and that the CT recruitment and selection process is an effective mechanism for providing the Agency with high caliber personnel.

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It is recommended that:

No. 14

a. The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training and the Director of Personnel:

(1) To tighten existing briefing procedures of applicants for the CT Program to ensure that applicants are adequately briefed by recruiters and Headquarters personnel to minimize security and cover problems.

(2) To review existing processing methods to identify and correct procedures which unduly reveal Agency interest in applicants.

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G. Entrance on Duty and Interim Assignments

When a CT enters on duty he initially receives the normal Agency EOD processing given to all professional employees. This processing, spaced over a period of two weeks, includes briefings by the Office of Security, the Office of Personnel and the Office of Training. Early in this period a member of Cover Staff assigns the CT his cover and the CT personnel officer and a Program Officer on the CT staff brief the CT on the training curriculum and discuss the Agency's promotion policy. They also answer any questions the CT may have on the Agency or the CT Program. Wives of CTs receive a group briefing on the CT Program during the first week of formal training.

To decrease the numbers of applicants who might decline employment during the long pre-employment waiting period, the CT Staff often enters an applicant on duty as soon as he is cleared, whether or not a CT class is about to begin formal instructions. If a class is not scheduled to begin for three weeks or longer, the CT is given an interim or temporary work assignment in an operating component. Under the three-class-per-year cycle beginning in 1967, the interim assignment may extend to four months.

The numbers of CTs on interim assignment will vary, depending on the timing of the next class. As of 1 December 1966, for example, 23 CTs were on duty awaiting the beginning of the February 1967 class. In addition to CTs on interim assignments while awaiting the beginning of their formal training, there are usually a few CTs on interim assignments waiting for military duty in Agency-sponsored programs and CTs between classes.

The Program Officers on the CT Staff take the first steps in assigning a CT to an interim assignment. In planning the assignment, the Program Officer has at his disposal language qualifications and educational and other background information on the CT. He is also

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familiar with the CT's personal preference and with the needs of the Agency. When dealing with the Directorate of Intelligence, he contacts the office concerned, sometimes at the desk or branch level, but assignments to the Clandestine Services and the Support Services are made through a central personnel officer.

Our survey showed that in most cases the interim assignments are satisfactory and make a useful contribution to the CT's development by providing him an opportunity to work and to see the Agency at work. One CT told an inspector that after he had entered on duty he had reservations about a long-term career in the Agency, but his interim assignment of three months on a WH desk was so rewarding it convinced him he should remain with the Agency.

We also uncovered, however, evidence that the interim assignments do not always receive enough attention and are considered a stopgap measure. Two CTs who resigned in 1966 and one who resigned in 1967 said that dissatisfaction with their interim assignments in the Clandestine Services was a major factor in their resignations. One claimed he was underemployed and had to look for work; another found the work boring and lacking in challenge. Other CTs also commented to us that interim assignments need more attention than they have been getting.

The CT Program and Personnel Officers caution the CTs that their interim assignment may or may not be challenging but, at least, it gives them a chance to get settled in Washington, to become acquainted with operations of the Agency and to make friends. It can be argued that CTs having received this admonition should be sufficiently mature to accept gracefully an interim assignment that does not necessarily tax their abilities. The fact remains, however, that when CTs join the Agency they are eager to go to work, and even though they are cautioned about interim assignments they may become disenchanted if they find themselves with little to do.

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This attitude is not typical of Agency trainees only. Personnel managers in industry have found that challenge and responsibility are among the most important factors that the young man of today looks for in his job.

When the CT Program was smaller, Program Officers had time to check carefully the suitability of interim assignments. But in view of the large number of CTs in the program today, this is no longer possible. A tightening of existing procedures is needed to improve the effectiveness of the assignments. Presently, after the component is notified of the assignment of a CT, there is seldom any further contact with the component until the CT completes his assignment. At that time he is required to submit a report of his work. The component providing the assignment is not obligated to report on the CT's performance, although it sometimes does so voluntarily. We believe that components need to be informed of the importance of the interim assignment.

It is recommended that:

No. 16

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training to prepare a memorandum of instruction for the Directorate of Intelligence, the Clandestine Services, and the Support Services, emphasizing the importance of the interim assignment and requesting that the component provide an evaluation of the CT's performance.

Another important aspect of interim assignments is that in the past they have often led to permanent assignment of the CT to the component sponsoring the interim assignment after the end of formal training. This occurs when the CT becomes interested in the component and when the component's management is impressed with his performance and qualifications.

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H. Training

1. Introduction

Beginning in February 1967, formal training classes for the 275 CTs the Agency hopes to recruit each year will be held three times a year. Excluding language training, CTs whose careers are in the Directorates of Intelligence or Support will be in a formal training status for about six months. CTs for the Clandestine Services will be in formal training for 18 to 22 months. If the one-to-four-month interim assignment which may precede formal training is included,

[REDACTED]

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for the Directorates of Intelligence and Support could spend up to ten months.

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[REDACTED] broadly defines the objective of the formal training program as that of developing the professional potential of qualified personnel to fill positions of increasingly greater responsibility within the Agency. We believe that through the years this requirement has been met. Senior Agency personnel in the operating components confirmed this. The CT training, however, is too long, and we found substantial evidence of training fatigue among CTs who were completing the program. Furthermore, the training is not always directly responsive to the needs of the Agency. This applies particularly to the training for CTs preparing for the Clandestine Services. There is a need for over-all coordination of the training program, and training can be carried out more effectively and economically than it is now being done.

As will be discussed in detail later in this section, the training cycle should be shortened appreciably. This can be done by combining the various familiarization courses into one course, by postponing language training, by combining pertinent elements of [REDACTED] training with the Operations Course, and by deleting the Managerial Grid and the 13 weeks of desk experience. Many subjects can be condensed without losing their instructional value.

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Our recommendations, if accepted, would reduce the total time spent in a training status for the Clandestine Services from [REDACTED] and training for the Directorates of Intelligence and Support from six to four months.

This will improve the quality of training and CTs will not be suffering from training fatigue when they report to operating components. Shortening the over-all training program has other advantages. It would help with recruiting desirable young men and women, some of whom the Office of Personnel believes now fail to apply after talking with the recruiter, or decline after applying because of reluctance to enter a long training program.

CTs object to the lengthy CT training program, particularly the training required for the Clandestine Services. Some CTs resign from the Agency because of this. Several senior operating officials in the Clandestine Services told us that CTs joining their divisions were stale from the prolonged training.

This attitude confirms what private enterprise, with whom we are in competition for trainees, has found. All management trainees, whether in CIA or in industry, need to experience at an early date a sense of accomplishment. They chafe at long formal training programs.

The Agency's CTs do not differ markedly from industry's trainees except they may be more mature. Most CTs are in their mid to late 20s and have had military and other non-academic experience after acquiring basic BA degrees. Some have left graduate school because they are tired of being professional students. They join the Agency in search of challenge and an opportunity to go to work only to find themselves in another prolonged quasi-academic environment.

Most U.S. companies are meeting this problem by drastically cutting back on their formal training programs. Even on-the-job training, which takes 13 weeks of training for the Clandestine Services, is being abandoned by many private firms.

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Other U.S. Government agencies which attract high quality trainees are also minimizing formal training. Agencies participating in the Civil Service Commission's Management Intern Program, which enters on duty interns who pass competitive examinations as GS-7s and -9s, have one-year training programs emphasizing on-the-job training. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which had 14 trainees in 1966, only four weeks were spent on initial orientation. The rest of the year's training emphasized work assignments sprinkled with short courses.

Formal course training for junior foreign service officers consists of an eight-week program known as the Basic Foreign Service Officers Course, which provides an understanding of the Foreign Service role in foreign policy.

CIA, on the other hand, is moving in the opposite direction and is constantly adding to its training program. We do recognize, however, that a career in intelligence is unique and not being closely related to academic training requires more specialized training than does private industry or other government activities.

We find some evidence that the length of training courses and, in some instances, the type of training given to those CTs going into the Clandestine Services is controlled not by a determination as to how much or what type of training is needed but by a pre-determined period of time over which a CT should be trained. We find little evidence that training requirements for the over-all program have been arrived at through consultation with consumer divisions and staffs. It has not been a question of whether the training is meeting the requirements of the components within the Clandestine Services but whether the training is being extended over what is considered an appropriate period of time to qualify a CT for an assignment in the Clandestine Services.

During this predetermined period of training, considered to be [REDACTED] for the Clandestine Services, some operating officials and training instructors look on


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the CTs as being in training confinement. We often heard this attitude expressed as, "Let's give them all the training we can while they're still captives." Such thinking has led to a somewhat haphazard adding to the program of courses, the value of which is questionable. The one-week Managerial Grid Course, for example, was added in 1966 to CT training. While this course is appropriate for mid-careerists and senior officers, we question its suitability for CTs. A two

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In the remainder of this section on training we discuss each course taken by CTs. In some instances we recommend condensing, combining, or eliminating existing subject material. Our over-all recommendation on the CT training cycle appears on page 87. A summary of current course and proposed IG revisions is on pages 87 and 88.

2. Formal Courses

a. Familiarization Training

All CTs take the same courses for their first 13 weeks of formal training as follows:

Introduction to Intelligence	2 weeks
Intelligence Techniques	3 weeks
Challenge of Worldwide Communism	4 weeks
Operations Familiarization	4 weeks

We believe that the objectives of these courses, with the exception of Challenge of Worldwide Communism, should be to familiarize CTs with the functions of the Agency. But only Introduction to Intelligence, which develops an understanding of the concepts of intelligence, approaches being a familiarization course. Intelligence Techniques gives instructions in techniques of the Directorate of Intelligence, and Operation Familiarization instructs in Clandestine Services tradecraft.

We see no valid reason for the teaching of intelligence techniques during these opening weeks of training, particularly since, after Operations Familiarization, the CTs attend courses especially designed to train them in skills needed by the directorates where they are to be assigned. Neither do we find justification for three separate familiarization courses. Individually, these courses have many excellent points, but taken together they contain needless duplication.

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We believe that the course content can be made more responsive to the needs of the Agency for familiarizing CTs with Agency operations by combining the three courses into one all-purpose familiarization course under a single course director. With the elimination of duplication and the deletion of instructions in techniques, the nine weeks now spent on these three courses could readily be reduced to six weeks.

In the remainder of this section on familiarization training we will discuss separately Introduction to Intelligence, Intelligence Techniques, and Operations Familiarization. We also discuss the need for Support Services familiarization, which we believe should be included in CT familiarization.

(1) Introduction to Intelligence

The objectives of this two-week lecture course are to develop an understanding of the fundamental concepts of intelligence, the role of U.S. intelligence agencies and the functions of CIA. Lectures are given by members of the Briefing Faculty of OTR, and by guest speakers from other Agency components. The course is well run and the over-all quality of speakers is usually excellent with the exception of some guest speakers from the Clandestine Services. We noted that some of the course content is duplicated in later courses, particularly the lectures delivered by speakers from the Clandestine Services. This includes the one-hour lectures on PM activities, Clandestine Services Reporting and Counterintelligence, all of which are later covered in Operations Familiarization. Movies used in the course for describing activities of the Directorate of Intelligence are out of date and do not accurately reflect these operations. In view of the course objectives aimed at familiarization, a final exam does not appear to be necessary.

During this introductory phase of training, we believe there is a need for a presentation on the Role of the U.S. in the World Today, preferably by a non-Agency speaker. This should be related to a lecture on American Policies and Practices, perhaps similar to that given in the Introduction to Intelligence for non-CTs and similar to the

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Peace Corps' American Democracy and Institutions. In the Challenge of Worldwide Communism Course half of one day is spent on reading and group discussion on values of American society. Some of this might well be included at this point in the CTs' training. Another desirable introductory lecture might be similar to the talk given by the Chief of [REDACTED] to the graduating [REDACTED] class on what is expected of a CT in CIA and on "facts of life" in a large organization such as ours.

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We believe that these additional lectures can be added and at the same time this section of training reduced to about one week by eliminating many of the formal presentations on Agency organization and functions.

Several of the lectures such as the ones on [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and intelligence research facilities can be included later in our proposed familiarization course.

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(2) Intelligence Techniques Course

The objective of this three-week course, which follows the Introduction to Intelligence, is to provide instruction and practice in the techniques used by the Directorate of Intelligence in the production of intelligence. OTR also views this course as giving CTs the opportunity to look at that Directorate's functions, to help them make known their inclinations toward an Agency career in that Directorate, and also as giving OTR a chance to evaluate the capability of the CT for that type of work. This course, available only to CTs, is the responsibility of the Intelligence Production Faculty of OTR. It is presented with imagination and the CTs, who are kept busily engaged in preparing written exercises and briefings based on intelligence publications, have high praise for it.

We share the CT view of the operation of the course but have reservations about the basic objective of the course. We do not believe that "instruction" and "practice"

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in the production of intelligence are needed during the early weeks of CT training. The objective of this course should be to familiarize CTs with the Directorate of Intelligence. With familiarization as an objective, blocks of instruction such as the five hours spent on [REDACTED] and the five hours on [REDACTED] reporting could be eliminated. Two weeks should be sufficient to provide necessary familiarization on the Directorate of Intelligence, since CTs heading for that Directorate later receive detailed instruction in intelligence operations in the Intelligence Production Course.

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(3) Operations Familiarization Course

The four-week Operations Familiarization Course (OFC) is [REDACTED] for CTs and non-CTs. Non-CTs are usually in the minority, but of the 339 students in the four OFC courses held in CY 1966 the percentage of non-CTs varied from 14% to 60% of the total class. The name of the course is in conflict with the course objective, which is to give a comprehensive understanding of the operational methods of the Clandestine Services, its FI, CI and CA programs and operational and intelligence reporting. In attempting to give the student a "comprehensive understanding," the course goes far

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A senior instructor at [REDACTED] pointed out that the OFC is not really a familiarization course because students are rated on their proficiency. The evaluation of the student's performance, which is placed in his personnel file, discusses his individual performance in Clandestine Services skills including simulated agent meetings and operational and intelligence reporting.

We see little justification for the OFC teaching tradecraft and other details of clandestine operations. CTs headed for the Clandestine Services (96 from the

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
four CT classes of 1966) will get this kind of training later in the OC, and CTs going to the Directorates of Intelligence or Support (104 from the 1966 classes) will, we feel, receive adequate operational familiarization in the proposed shortened course. By regarding the objective of the OFC as truly familiarization, we believe that the course content can be shortened to two weeks and incorporated into a six-week all purpose familiarization course at Headquarters. Instructors from OTR's Headquarters Operations School with the help of guest speakers should be able to provide instruction for this portion of the course.

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Although the faculty at [REDACTED] is not united in its views on the desirability of holding the OFC in Headquarters, some senior instructors feel strongly that the training at [REDACTED] should be restricted to CTs headed for the Clandestine Services. This group feels that holding the OFC [REDACTED] interferes with the running of the OC and dilutes the quality of instruction in the OC. We share this view.

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The CT Staff views the OFC as a means of exposing the CT to the Clandestine Services, and assisting the CT in making known his wishes regarding a career in the Clandestine Services. We believe that the two weeks of Clandestine Services familiarization in the all purpose familiarization course should be sufficient for this need.

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The CT Staff also views the OFC as a means for the Agency to evaluate the suitability of a CT for a career in the Clandestine Services. The Chief of the OFC, however, told us that because of the large number of students taking the OFC, his instructors are able to make only a cursory evaluation of their performance and suitability for the Clandestine Services. This emphasizes the need for earlier identification of CTs for assignment to a directorate and the need to use existing information on CTs to assist in this selection rather than relying on the OFC evaluation of CTs.

Non-CTs who attend the OFC-- the November/ December 1966 course had 11 non-CTs-- can be trained by existing operations courses presented in Headquarters by OTR. Non-CTs could also be trained by running a separate two-week familiarization course, which would probably be more suitable for training staff employees and contract employees than the existing OFC. There is already a precedent for this. The Introduction to Intelligence and the first two weeks of Challenge of Worldwide Communism, which all CTs take, are also held separately for other Agency professional employees.

(4) Support Services Familiarization

During most of the history of the CT Program, few CTs chose the Support Services as a career. In recent years, however, as the result of the DDS' emphasizing the need for encouraging CTs to enter the Support Services, increased numbers of CTs have elected to serve in his Directorate. In CY 1966, 66 CTs were headed for the Support Services area out of a total of 201 CTs who entered formal training. The one-hour lecture given by the Deputy Director for Support in the Introduction to Intelligence is a major factor in this change. Other contributing factors are the result of comments on the effectiveness of the program from CTs already in the directorate and from CT Staff counseling.

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While this speaks well for the improved reputation of the Support Services as a career, we do not believe that CTs under current training procedures receive enough lectures on the Support Services. CTs are exposed to the Directorate of Intelligence in the Intelligence Techniques Course and to the Clandestine Services in the OFC, but the only instruction CTs receive on the Support Services area is five hours during the Introduction to Intelligence. This limited exposure does not give the CT enough information to make a decision regarding a career in the Support Services or to appreciate that directorate's varied role.

We believe, therefore, that the DDS should be allocated a block of instruction in the all-purpose Familiarization Course sufficient to familiarize the CT with the operations of the various components of the Support Services. The material presented in the Familiarization Course could be used as a foundation for the seven-week Support Services Course required for CTs entering components of the Support Services.

It is recommended that:

No. 17

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training, with representatives from the Directorate of Intelligence, the Clandestine Services and the Directorate of Science and Technology, as appropriate, to design a six-week course to be held at Headquarters to familiarize CTs with the functions of the Agency, to replace the nine weeks of training now consumed by Introduction to Intelligence, Intelligence Techniques, and Operations Familiarization.

b. Challenge of Worldwide Communism

The objectives of this four-week course are to develop a familiarization with the doctrine, organization and tactics of International Communism and to develop an understanding of the challenges facing the United

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States from Communism. The course, required for all CTs, follows the Intelligence Techniques Course and is the responsibility of the OTR's School of International Communism. The content of the course is built on two existing courses available to non-CT professional employees: Introduction to Communism and Communist Party Organization and Operations. The course consists of lectures by a highly competent faculty, seminars, problems involving CT participation, and required reading on communist theory and history of Communism. The course is extremely well done and meets its objectives. CTs had high praise for the tempo of instruction, the currency and depth of substance and the caliber of the instructors.

c. Managerial Grid Course

The Managerial Grid Course, now required for all CTs, uses the grid concept of classifying leadership to permit an understanding of managerial styles of others as a means of diagnosing problems, opening communications and developing team action skills. The Support School of OTR is responsible for this course.

In our interviews, CTs and OTR training officers raised questions on the value of giving this training to junior officers. In theory the training progresses from senior supervisors down the echelon. In this instance the progression is reversed and the grid is given to junior officers who most likely will be assigned to supervisors completely unfamiliar with the purposes of the grid system. Thus the CT has undergone an additional week of training of little immediate advantage to himself or the Agency.

Most of the Agency's experience with this course, prior to the requirement for CTs taking it in 1966, was with senior officers. Of the over 400 Agency personnel who took the course up to the time of the requirement for CTs, the most sizeable block was in the grade of GS-15 and above. Another sizeable group was that made

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up of mid-career GS-13s and -14s. It is OTR's experience that the group that had benefited the most is the mid-career group.

This course is given by OTR separately for other Agency professional personnel and CTs could take it later in their Agency careers when they have advanced to supervisory responsibilities. At that future time the grid would be appropriate to the individual and advantageous to the Agency because the CT would be in or approaching the level of mid-career development. In view of this and in consideration of the already overextended program of training for CTs, we do not believe that the contribution to the CTs' training of the Managerial Grid Course is sufficient to warrant continuing it.

It is recommended that:

No. 18

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training to delete the Managerial Grid Course from the CT Training Program.

d. Intelligence Production Course

The objective of the nine-week Intelligence Production Course is to prepare CTs for assignment to the Directorate of Intelligence, but a few CTs who are to be assigned to the Directorate of Science and Technology may also take the course. CTs acquire a detailed knowledge of the offices of the Directorate of Intelligence and receive training in skills required to produce intelligence. Instructional techniques include lectures, written and oral exercises, tours of the intelligence production offices, and brief work assignments there.

The course, which currently averages 15 CTs per class, helps the CT determine the component most appropriate to his interests and training and provides the CT Staff with information to aid in determining his assignment. From the inception of this course the Intelligence Production Faculty of OTR has had responsibility for the management

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of the course and primary responsibility for its content. This course has been considered for some years as the presentation to the CTs of the "DDI image," but has had no formal review by the Office of the DDI. Currently such review is being performed by a senior officer representing the DDI.

We believe that the course provides the CT with a good introduction to the Directorate of Intelligence through personal contact with supervisors and analysts in OCI, ORR and other components as well as with ONE and does help in determining final placement. These offices have been extremely cooperative in providing senior officers to lecture, to conduct seminars and to meet with the CTs for informal discussion. In ONE arrangements are made for the class to sit in on a regular meeting of the Board of National Estimates and to talk with the area officers.

We believe, however, that the course is too long and run at a too leisurely pace. Elements of the course which we believe could be reduced are the three weeks allowed for the major research project, the extensive time spent in map reading and the day spent looking at computers. Some supervisors in the Directorate of Intelligence stated that the time spent in the Intelligence Production Course would be more useful to the CT and the receiving component if equivalent time were spent training on the desk. We do not share this view. We agree with the comments of CTs on the job whom we interviewed who stated that they had found the course to be helpful to them not only in giving them a working knowledge of Agency components but also of elements in the Intelligence Community outside of the Agency.

With the completion of this course, which follows the OFC, the CT finishes formal training in the CT Program and enters on trial assignment with a component of the Directorate of Intelligence.

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The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training to meet with representatives of the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Science and Technology as appropriate, to review the objectives and doctrine of the Intelligence Production Course and develop a curriculum of about six weeks.

e. Support Services Course

The objective of the eight-week Support Services Course is to prepare CTs for assignments in the Support components of the Agency. CTs receive familiarization on Support Services components, but the emphasis is on small field station operations. Travel, logistics, finance and other pertinent subjects are studied. The course, available only to CTs, is managed by the Support School of OTR, which worked closely with the Training Officer of the Support Services in planning the curriculum. This training, which follows the OFC, is the last formal course taken by CTs before assignment.

We believe that the course is meeting its objective in a highly satisfactory manner, but we noted one slight problem. Through 1966, most of the 98 CTs who took the course since it began in 1965 were assigned overseas. But in the third course only five out of 23 CTs received overseas assignments. The CTs from this class who were assigned to Headquarters duty complained to us over the emphasis in their training on overseas duties. This might be remedied by requirements for CTs earlier so that assignments could be decided on before the course began. This would permit modifications in the curriculum to include more emphasis on Headquarters operations when most CTs in a given class are to begin service in Headquarters.



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is a prerequisite for the course. After finishing the OFC, the CTs take two weeks of formal Headquarters desk training, the Managerial Grid and 14 weeks of actual desk experience before beginning the OC. In 1966, 85 CTs and four non-CTs took the two runnings of the course.

Instruction emphasizes live problems and is broken down as follows:

50% on live problems
35% on seminars
10% on lectures

The main topics covered in the course are: tradecraft which emphasizes agent handling and recruitment, intelligence and operational information reporting, counter-intelligence, covert action, Clandestine Services operating programs, photography, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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In its present format the OC is almost entirely oriented toward city operations and the [REDACTED] toward rural areas. In an effort to offset the emphasis on city operations, a full day on counterinsurgency has been added to the OC. One result of this is to duplicate material later covered in the [REDACTED]. A better solution would be to combine the urban problems of the OC with the rural problems of the [REDACTED] into one operations course.

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We were very favorably impressed with the [REDACTED] management of the course and the high caliber of the [REDACTED] instructors on the Operations Staff responsible for the running of the course. The caliber of instructors has greatly improved in the last few years as the result of joint OTR/Clandestine Services effort. The DDP, realizing the need for providing OTR with experienced operations officers, considers a tour in OTR to be comparable to an overseas tour for career purposes.

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The ratio of DDP careerists to OTR careerists is favorable. During the November 1966 - January 1967 running


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It is recommended that:

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The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training to have CTs and CT applicants informed of the desirability of having a basic typing skill and to assist CTs to acquire this basic skill.

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the CTs training for the Clandestine Services not receiving a trial attachment is that under the new program they take 13 weeks of desk experience part way through their training.

a. Headquarters Desk Training

The objective of the two-week formal Headquarters Desk Training is to familiarize CTs with desk operations in the Clandestine Services prior to their 13 weeks work experience on the desk. The training follows the one-week Managerial Grid and the Operations Familiarization Course. It does not duplicate later training taken in the Operations Course because the Operations Course is aimed at training CTs for field operations rather than the functions of Headquarters. The course had a trial running in October 1966 for five female CTs. The first full running was in January 1967 for 38 CTs.

The training, which is the responsibility of OTR's Operations School, is divided into the following separate units:

Unit 1	Clandestine Services Records I	2 days
Unit 2	Clandestine Services Records II	4 days
Unit 3	Role of Headquarters Desk Officer	3 days

Units 1 and 2 are standard OTR courses available to all Clandestine Services personnel. Clandestine Services Records I covers the Clandestine Services records system: input, maintenance and retrieval methods. Clandestine Services Records II concentrates on Agency resources for running a name trace and preparing biographic information studies. Unit 3, a newly developed block of instruction, is concerned with the organization and functions of a Headquarters branch, policy guidance to the field, and operational supervision and guidance exercised by a branch.

In view of our later recommendation that the 13 weeks desk experience be eliminated, this block of instruction would better serve the training needs of the CT Program if it were given after the CT returns to Headquarters

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following completion of the Operations Course at the [REDACTED] and prior to his attachment to an operating component.

b. Desk Experience

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The 13 weeks of desk experience for CTs being trained for the Clandestine Services follows the Operations Familiarization Course, the Managerial Grid and the two-week formal Headquarters desk training. After completing this training the CTs go to the [REDACTED] to take the 14-week Operations Course. The purpose of the desk experience is to acquaint CTs with Clandestine Services operating procedures and to provide a break in their formal training. We see little justification for this training. Under our proposed shortened training cycle, desk experience can equally well be acquired after the completion of formal training when the CT can be attached on trial to an operating component.

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Recent moves to lengthen the training of CTs for the Clandestine Services up to two years with the addition of the [REDACTED] Course, several Headquarters courses, and proposed language training have temporarily disrupted the six months attachment concept. OTR for budgetary reasons cannot keep CTs on its rolls this additional time. Our recommendation to shorten the over-all training of CTs for the Clandestine Services from two years to nine months would again permit the six-month trial attachment to be used as a period of desk instruction.

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Viewing the desk experience as a break in formal training does not appear to be sufficient justification for this training. If the total training is shortened as we have recommended, a break consisting of a week or two of annual leave could be inserted part way through our proposed Combined Operations-[REDACTED] Course at the [REDACTED]

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
Another objection to the 13 weeks of desk experience is that about one-third of the CTs required to participate in the desk experience, according to CT Staff estimates, have already been exposed to desk work. The CTs with this work experience fall into two groups: internal CTs who may already have served on a desk and external CTs who have had interim assignments while awaiting the beginning of the formal training program. The CT Staff is aware of this problem and can exclude CTs with equivalent experience from the desk work, but the CT Staff must then find an adequate training substitute. This places additional administrative strains on the CT Staff, which is already overburdened with administrative details.

It is recommended that:

No. 25

The Deputy Director for Support recommend to the Deputy Director for Plans the elimination of the 13-week desk experience from the CT Training Program.

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In late 1966 the Bureau of the Budget told the Agency it would have to absorb the estimated \$600,000 in additional costs as a result of the two-year training proposal but approved the existing program of bringing on 275 CTs per year. This means that OTR can hold CTs on its rolls for only about 18 months and stay within its budget. CTs in language training beyond 18 months will be permanently assigned to the Clandestine Services, which will then be responsible for their continued language training.

We have strong reservations on the desirability of language training for CTs at the end of their formal classroom training. At this point in their Agency careers, all of which has been in training, they are anxious to start work and gain a feeling of accomplishment rather than continuing in an academic environment for another four to six months. Division operations officers responsible for the Soviet Bloc and China Operations Courses, taken by CTs just before language training, commented on the apathy of CTs. This apathy, the result of lengthy training, made it difficult to reach the CTs with the course content.

Most of the senior operating division officials whom we interviewed in the Clandestine Services object to the current approach to language training. They would prefer to start the CT on a desk assignment immediately after he finishes his operations training, have him remain on the desk for 6 to 18 months and then study a language just prior to his first assignment overseas. They point out that one of the disadvantages in the CTs studying a language before the desk assignment is that the average CT will forget much of his language during his desk assignment and will need a refresher course before an overseas assignment or may have to take an additional language directed at the country of assignment.

As we have pointed out elsewhere, the Agency does not know at this stage of a CT's development if he will make the Agency a career, nor do we know whether the language studied will be the most pertinent to his overseas

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assignment. He may resign during training or before going overseas; or he may have attained required proficiency in a language of marginal value in his country of assignment. Since six months of language training costs the Agency about \$7,500 per CT, from a cost point of view the advisability of giving language training at this time in a CT's career is questionable.

It is recommended that:

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We have discussed each of the courses taken by CTs and have made recommendations concerning many of them. In arriving at our over-all recommendation on the CT training cycle, we monitored a cross-section of classes in most of the courses. We reviewed critiques of courses prepared by both CTs and instructors. We interviewed CTs taking these courses, CTs on interim assignments, and former CTs who have served for several years in the various directorates. We talked with instructors and senior Agency officials. We have summarized the current training cycle and IG proposals for training on pages 87 and 88. Our opinion, which is supported by the consensus of those interviewed, is that the CT training cycle for all directorates can be appreciably condensed without loss of instructional value. We have arrived at an estimated four months of formal training for CTs entering the Directorates of Intelligence and Support and an approximate nine months for those entering the Clandestine Services. We do not consider these periods to be necessarily the final length

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of the training cycle. However, we do consider them to be reasonable guidelines for reviewing the CT training program and focusing the objectives on current conditions.

It is recommended that:

No. 27

The Deputy Director for Support, in consultation with the Deputy Director for Plans and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, review the CT training cycle with the objective of reducing the training period of CTs going into the Clandestine Services from [REDACTED] and for CTs going into the Directorate of Intelligence and Support Services from six months to four months.

CURRENT AND IG-PROPOSED PROGRAMS

<u>Courses Taken by All CTs</u>	<u>Weeks</u>	
	<u>Current</u>	<u>Proposed</u>
Introduction to Intelligence	2)
Intelligence Techniques	3) 6 (one course)
Operations Familiarization	4)
Challenge of Worldwide Communism	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
Totals	13	10

Additional Training of DDP CTs

Formal Hqs Desk Training
Managerial Grid
Desk Experience
Operations Course

Language Testing
Soviet Operations
China Operations

Totals

Additional Training for DDI CTs

Managerial Grid
Intelligence Production

Totals

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1	Eliminate
<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>
10	6

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<u>Additional Training for DDS CTs</u>	<u>Weeks</u>	
	<u>Current</u>	<u>Proposed</u>
Managerial Grid	1	Eliminate
Support Services	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
Totals	8	7

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Total Formal Directorate of Intelligence Training	23	16
Total Formal Support Services Training	21	17

Including normal vacations of two to three weeks, CTs undergoing Clandestine Services training are in a formal training status for [REDACTED]. If three to six months are added for training in a language to attain the intermediate proficiency level desired by the DDP, the total formal training period would be [REDACTED] and since CTs enter on duty from a few days to four months before formal training begins, it is possible that a CT could be in training status for [REDACTED].

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5. Training Coordinator

During our inspection we were repeatedly told by OTR personnel that the various courses taken by CTs need more coordination than now exists. Our survey confirms this need. While most of the individual courses are extremely well done, the program as a whole contains needless duplication. The content, for example, of several lectures given by Clandestine Services officers in Introduction to Intelligence in Headquarters is duplicated during the Operations Familiarization Course. The China Operations and Soviet Operations Courses duplicated material given in other courses and a proposed TSD course would have duplicated instruction already given in the Operations Course.

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We believe that the appointment of a training coordinator responsible to the Director of Training, whose duties would include reviewing the content of all the courses in the program, would correct this duplication. While reviewing course content the coordinator should also determine if subject matter in individual courses is related to the over-all objectives of the program. Teaching techniques, including adequacy of graphic aids, motion pictures, and instructor presentation are other areas that need over-all reviewing. A training coordinator could have detected the pedagogical weakness in the two-week China Operations Course.

The training coordinator could also be a point of contact with the Assessment and Evaluation (A&E) Staff of the Office of Medical Services. The A&E psychologists can be of assistance in sampling student reaction to instruction, changes in student motivation and interests as they progress in the course, and in offering suggestions for improving instruction techniques. Another important area that A&E can help is in interpreting the psychological makeup of the CTs, their anxieties and goals to the CT Staff and instructors. An instructor at the [REDACTED] pointed out that some 20 to 30 years separate the average instructor from the CTs. He suggested that it would help the instructors to communicate with the CTs if they knew more about the drives and objectives of the CTs.

Several senior OTR officers urged that there be more contact on training between the chiefs of the five schools in OTR and the [REDACTED] each of whom is responsible for some part of CT training. A training coordinator could assist the Director of Training by chairing meetings with the chiefs of the schools and of the [REDACTED] to discuss details of training. These meetings would also give the chiefs of schools the opportunity, not now available, of exchanging ideas for improvements of training. The Chief of the CT Staff, who despite his intimate association with the CT Program has little to say about the training of CTs, should also attend these meetings. Heads of faculties should also be invited to participate.

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The training coordinator should keep abreast of latest training developments in government and industry, a function of the Director of Training under [REDACTED]. He could act as a focal point for the application in OTR of the research on industry's and government's experience with programmed learning being done by the former Director of Training. Another responsibility would be to maintain contact on CT training matters with training officers and operating officials in the directorates.

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In considering desirable qualifications for a training coordinator, a teaching background would be helpful but not necessary. Of more importance would be a thorough knowledge of the needs of the Agency.

There is a precedent in OTR for the position of training coordinator. Several years ago a senior member of the CT Staff, a GS-15 Career Training Officer with Clandestine Services operational experience, had among his other duties that of coordinating training courses for CTs. But because his other duties had higher priority, he was unable to make significant progress as a coordinator. When this officer left the CT Staff, the coordinating function was not renewed.

It is recommended that:

No. 28

The Deputy Director for Support assign a senior officer to the Office of Training to report directly to the Director of Training as a Special Assistant for coordinating training. His duties as related to the CT Program should include:

a. Reviewing Career Training Program course content to ensure that individual courses are related to the over-all objectives of the program and that needless duplication is not included.

b. Ensuring that sound instructional techniques are employed.

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c. Chairing meetings with chiefs of schools and staffs to exchange ideas for improving CT training.

d. Keeping abreast of latest training developments in government and industry.

e. Maintaining liaison with the Assessment and Evaluation Staff of the Office of Medical Services to take advantage of the services A&E can offer to CT training.

f. Maintaining contact with training officers and operating officials in the three primary directorates that use CTs.

6. DDI Representation in OTR

Traditionally the DDI has given only slight attention to the training of CTs. But in the fall of 1966, concerned over the Directorate image presented to the CTs, he assigned a senior official to review training of CTs and to review course content pertaining to his Directorate. This representative has recommended that there be a permanent representative of the DDI in OTR. We believe that this recommendation is sound.

The duties of the Directorate representative could include reviewing course content and making certain the curriculum meets the needs of the Directorate for CTs and coordinating any substantive changes with OTR. He could coordinate requirements for CT assignees and work with the CT Program Officers in planning both interim and long-term assignments leading to permanent placement. He could be available to discuss with individual CTs careers in the Directorate, thus easing pressure on the counseling function of the CT Program Officers. He could act as coordinator for the intelligence briefings which OCI now presents to the CTs during their entire training program as a result of the recommendation by

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the Directorate representative in December 1966. He could also serve as the focal point for general support to OTR. An ideal length of tour would be about two years.

It is recommended that:

No. 29

The Deputy Director for Support negotiate with the Deputy Director for Intelligence for the assignment of an experienced officer, preferably from OCI, to the Office of Training as a special assistant to the Director of Training to represent the Deputy Director for Intelligence in OTR.

7. Need for Instructor Training

Instructors in Operations [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] have a wealth of operating experience but only a few have had any teaching experience. With the increased numbers of Clandestine Services careerists being assigned [REDACTED] as opposed to OTR careerists, this lack of teaching experience has become more noticeable. Several instructors [REDACTED] both Agency careerists and contract employees, feel a need for assistance in preparing segments of instruction and in basic instructional techniques.

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Requiring all officers, newly assigned to OTR as instructors, to take the one-week Instructor Training Course would give them a useful exposure to pedagogical methods, which when combined with their operational experience would greatly improve their over-all effectiveness as instructors. The Instructor Training Course has not been given regularly since the death of the course's chief instructor in mid-1965 and was not listed in recent issues of the OTR Bulletin. OTR, however, retains the capability of presenting the course and gives it when there is a need. Operations instructors in Headquarters took the course in July 1966. But OTR's records show that the course has not been given to the instructors [REDACTED] since February 1965. Since there is a 30% to 40% turnover in instructors each year, this course should probably be made available to instructors [REDACTED] several times a year.

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We believe it would also help to have an officer experienced in teaching techniques assigned to the staff of the Chief [REDACTED]. This officer would be available to help instructors improve their teaching methods, help them plan new blocks of instruction, and to revise old material.

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A few years ago the Agency consultant in effective speaking and conference techniques from [REDACTED] used to visit [REDACTED] and offer suggestions for improving techniques of presentation. Instructors found this to be helpful.

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It is recommended that:

No. 30

The Deputy Director for Support instruct the Director of Training to:

a. Require that all career officers and contract employees assigned to OTR as instructors take the Instructors Training Course.

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b. Assign an officer experienced in teaching techniques to the staff of the [REDACTED] to assist instructors in improving instructional techniques and in preparing blocks of instruction.

8. Training of Women CTs

In early 1967 the DDP established a program lasting from [REDACTED] weeks for the training of women CTs who are destined for the Clandestine Services. After initially taking the basic 13 weeks of instruction common to all CTs including the Operations Familiarization Course, they take one of four special courses: CE, Reports, CA and Operations. These courses include 12 weeks of on-the-desk training. Included in the schedule are courses

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whose value we have questioned for all CTs. Although this program is in its initial running, it appears to have certain undesirable factors common to the training for male CTs such as extended length of time, duplication, and the inclusion of the Managerial Grid. We have previously recommended that the CT training cycle be shortened. In a similar manner we believe this training for women CTs can be appreciably condensed without loss of instructional value.

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I. Placement

Placement of CTs is well handled. The first step in the process begins with the recruiter, who may indicate on his interview report where he thinks the CT could best serve the Agency. The Program Officers on the CT Staff during the Headquarters interviews of applicants usually comment on the applicant's potential, and the A&E Staff also contributes its views. These are now only preliminary steps, however, and the formal identification of the CT for a particular directorate is not made until the CT has completed 13 weeks of training including the Operations Familiarization Course (OFC). This identification, which is one of the major functions of the CT Staff, is based on everything that the Agency knows about the CT plus the needs of the Agency and the preference of the CT.

After the OFC, CTs selected for the Directorate of Intelligence take the nine-week Intelligence Production Course; CTs for the Support Services take the Support Services Course; CTs for the Clandestine Services take two weeks of classroom work in the operation of a Headquarters desk and then begin a 13-week period of desk experience in a division.

In our section on Training we recommend that the four-week OFC be reduced to two weeks and combined with the Introduction to Intelligence and Intelligence Techniques Course into one familiarization course. This shortening of the OFC, which the CT Staff uses as an indicator in deciding whether or not a CT is suitable for the Clandestine Services, should not adversely affect the identification for a directorate. The instructors in the OFC told us that since they can give only a cursory evaluation of CTs because of the large classes, they doubt the validity of using the OFC as a fair indication of CT potential. Additionally, using a familiarization course as a major tool for determining a CT's career does not appear to be sound. The CT Staff has sufficient material on hand concerning the CT's backgrounds and interests to arrive at an early identification of directorate.

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Once a CT is identified for the Clandestine Services, the next step is the selection of the division where he will spend his 13 weeks of desk experience. Representatives of Operational Services and the Office of the DDP review the requests of the divisions and staffs for CTs and decide on allocations. With these allocations they review files of the CTs identified for the Clandestine Services and, after discussions with the CT Staff, assign the CT to a particular division.

Under our section on Training we recommend that the 13 weeks of desk experience be eliminated. This should not alter early identification by division. Earlier identification can be extremely helpful to the morale of the CTs who, until the recently devised selection for desk experience, did not learn of their division assignment until the very end of their training. Now they can read, study and discuss with instructors a geographic area on their own during training.

During their desk experience, CTs are exposed to another screening process. A panel, since April 1966, has interviewed CTs to determine their suitability for the Clandestine Services before they continue with their formal training. The panel is chaired by Chief, [REDACTED] and has four other senior members. The panel reviews files and interviews CTs to determine suitability and motivation. As of 1 February 1967 the panel had turned down only two CTs out of a total of 81 CTs interviewed. The panel had reservations on four others, three of whom performed satisfactorily in the remainder of their training.

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We question the need for this recently adopted screening process. The Clandestine Services is represented in the original selection of CTs and their placement after training by careerists from the Clandestine Services assigned to the CT Staff. As we have pointed out earlier, the selection of CTs is carried out in a highly commendable manner. Furthermore, the panel has rejected only a small percentage of CTs.

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It is recommended that:No. 31

The Deputy Director for Plans review the present procedure for determining suitability of CTs for the Clandestine Services to determine whether this additional screening process is necessary in view of the effectiveness of the initial screening of CT applicants by the CT Staff and the success of the Staff in placing CTs after training is completed.

Until the training for CTs going into the Clandestine Services was recently extended [REDACTED] all CTs on the completion of their formal training were attached to operating components for trial periods of three to six months. Now, only CTs entering the Directorate of Intelligence and the Support Services have a trial period which gives the CT a chance to prove himself on a real job. Each supervisor must submit a progress report to the CT Staff after three months, and the CTs must provide the CT Staff periodic progress reports. CTs remain on the rolls of OTR during this trial period. If their performance is satisfactory they are permanently assigned to the operating component.

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Most attachments lead to permanent assignments, but occasionally a CT is unable to perform at the level expected of him. In OCI, for example, he might not develop the ability of rapid writing to meet publication deadlines. An unsatisfactory attachment may also result from poor supervision, lack of work, or because the CT finds the work unsuited to his career objectives. When an attachment is not satisfactory, the CT Staff will try to place him elsewhere in the Agency. On rare occasions the CT may be tried on two or three jobs before being successfully placed. After exhausting all possibilities, the CT Staff may encourage the CT to resign.

Our interviews with CTs on trial attachments showed that the CTs are gainfully occupied and that their talents

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are being utilized. A CT in the Office of Security was working on automation of management information. Those in the Clandestine Services who were under the old training cycle had been given responsible desk assignments. In OCI CTs were assigned primary responsibility for current intelligence reporting on a particular country or on a problem relating to a country.

After CTs have satisfactorily completed trial periods of attachment, they leave the rolls of OTR and are permanently assigned to the directorate where they have been attached. If the component is an office in the Directorate of Intelligence, the CT will normally remain there for the rest of his career, although he may transfer to another component. While still a junior officer he might also transfer to the Clandestine Services, but this happens infrequently. Agency experience with regular input of CTs into the Support Services is too recent to permit generalizing. It is likely, though, that the CTs will remain in the Support Services, probably rotating to two or three offices or serving overseas before assuming the career designation of a particular office. If the component is a division of the Clandestine Services, the CT will probably remain in that division for his first several years in the Agency.

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J. Careers of CTs

Traditionally, most CTs have pursued their Agency careers in the Clandestine Services. When the 1960 IG survey of Agency training was made, 79% of all CTs were in the Clandestine Services, 18% in the Directorate of Intelligence, and 3% in the Support Services. This pattern has not changed appreciably although in recent years the percentage of CTs entering the Clandestine Services has declined slightly. At the end of Calendar Year 1966, of the 824 CTs assigned to Agency components, 72% were in the Clandestine Services, 17% in the Directorate of Intelligence, and 8% in the Support Services. The CTs in the remaining 3% were divided between the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Office of the Director. It is unlikely for the foreseeable future that the Directorate of Science and Technology will use more than a few CTs per year. That directorate is hiring scientists and technologists to fill critical needs. This does not normally permit time for several months of training in the CT Program.

Now that the CT Program is 15 years old, former CTs are beginning to move into middle and senior Agency positions. In OCI, for example, an area chief and a division chief are former CTs. ONE has four GS-15 estimates officers. A former Directorate of Intelligence officer from the first CT class is an office director in the Directorate of Science and Technology. The Clandestine Services has two GS-15 officials in Headquarters and [REDACTED] ranging in grade from GS-12 to GS-14. In the Support Services, one former CT is the chief of support in an area division. Within the next five to ten years the movement of CTs into senior positions should proceed rapidly.

Attrition

One of management's key concerns about any career training program is the attrition of the program's graduates. The over-all attrition of the Agency's CTs from the beginning of the program through December 1966 is 31%. Attrition from early classes is as high as 65%. Many of the

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factors which make for separation of CTs, such as the impact of security and cover on the CT and his family, are peculiar to CIA. But attrition is higher than in comparable programs outside the Agency, and we believe it is possible to reduce it.

In investigating CT attrition, we found that our first problem was to come up with a meaningful expression of attrition. During our interviews we received conflicting statements concerning attrition. After studying machine runs of CT separations and other pertinent material provided by the Office of Personnel and the Office of Training, we concluded that trying to express CT attrition in a single percentage is misleading, and that the most effective method of describing attrition is to consider attrition by blocks of classes since 1951.

We heard criticism of the accuracy of the machine listing used for our analysis. The criticism is that the listing, which shows CTs who have joined the Agency and left from 1951 through December 1966, records as separations CTs who have resigned to enter Agency-sponsored military programs and CTs who resign for cover reasons. We believe, however, that for our purposes of showing trends rather than analyzing every class the listing is adequate.

The machine listing shows that a total of 1648 CTs have joined the Agency since the first class in December 1951. Of these 1648 CTs, 504 or 31% have left the Agency, leaving 1144 or 69% still on duty. These percentages can be misleading, because they are based on every CT who has entered on duty, including CTs from the most recent classes and CTs who entered on duty in 1966 for the February 1967 class.

We believe that the most meaningful evaluation of attrition is had by excluding CTs in the most recent classes and by examining earlier groups. Early CT classes have greater attrition than recent classes. Of the 156 CTs, for example, who joined the Agency in the first five CT classes

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between December 1951 and December 1953, the attrition is 65%. There is a progressive decline in attrition in the later years, so that of the 374 CTs who were in the five classes from July 1962 to July 1964, the attrition is only 24%. Most attrition occurs while the CT is still a trainee.

In examining attrition of CTs, three sub-categories should be considered: externals, internals and female CTs. Of the 1379 externals who have entered on duty, 465 or 33.6% have left. Of the 269 internals, 39 or 14.5% have left. This is to be expected because internals enter the CT Program usually with at least two years of Agency experience and have decided on an Agency career before applying for the CT Program. As we indicated earlier, the lower attrition of internals is one of the advantages of having internals in the CT Program. At the same time, however, it does not mean that the Agency should place less emphasis on recruiting externals who in general have a higher potential than internals.

Analysis by sex of CTs shows that of the 1649 male CTs who entered on duty, 415 or 28% have left. Of the 179 females, 89 or 50% have left. Because of marriage and related factors, this attrition is not startling. Also, female CTs who separate are not always a net loss. Some of them marry Agency personnel and contribute to their husbands' careers.

In reviewing the attrition of CTs who have been in the Agency five years, we find that the Agency does not do quite as well as other organizations that operate training programs for high quality trainees such as the CT. The Agency had two classes in 1961 totaling 89 CTs. As of December 1966, 36 of these CTs had resigned, a 40% attrition. While this is lower than private enterprise's over-all 50% attrition, it is greater than specific employers with good management trainee programs, such as Chase Manhattan Bank, which has a five year attrition of 34%. The Agency's CT attrition is also greater than that of the

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federal government's Management Intern Program, which lost 32% of its 1961 group, and more than that of the Department of State's Junior Foreign Service Officers.

There are no panaceas for lowering attrition. CTs leave CIA for many of the same reasons that cause personnel turnover in industry, academic and professional fields. Other pastures appear greener; the salary and fringe benefits look better; the job offers more challenge and greater advancement potential. Reducing the rate of CT attrition depends on developing sounder personnel management throughout the career of the CT, both during and after his formal training. The following recommendations, made earlier in this report, are directed at correcting conditions that contribute to CT resignation:

- . Not mentioning promotion to GS-11 in 3 to 3-1/2 years. Recommendation No. 7, page 25.
- . Consideration of higher starting salaries. Recommendation No. 8, page 28.
- . Increased emphasis on counseling. Recommendation No. 2, page 16.
- . More attention on interim assignment. Recommendation No. 16, page 51.
- . Shortening of training program. Recommendation No. 27, page 87.

Career Monitoring

A common criticism of the CT Program is that it trains CTs for an office such as OCI or a directorate rather than training CTs for an Agency-wide career. We do not see, however, how the CT Program can do otherwise since the Agency is compartmented into numerous individual career services.

The development of the CT's career through selected assignment, rotation and promotion varies considerably by

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component. The Support Services is the only directorate that has a specific career program for CTs. When the CT is attached to that directorate, the Support Development Panel assigns him to an office or prepares him for an overseas tour. His career is then monitored for four to six years. This system started in early 1965 when the first Support Services Course was held.

The purpose of this program is to prepare CTs for management positions. To achieve this the DDS plans to rotate CTs in various offices on two-year work assignments. The assignments are flexible and if the CT performs well in his first assignment and if he wishes to remain there, that office might be his career.

As of February 1967, 98 CTs had completed the Support Services Course prior to assignment. The DDS



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The Support Development Panel reviews the CT's performance ten months after his last promotion in OTR. If his work has been satisfactory, he is promoted. His performance is reviewed annually thereafter and if he performs satisfactorily he is promoted to GS-11 when he then goes in competition with general support officers in the same grade.

The Foreign Service has a similar monitoring system. The Foreign Service takes on 150 to 200 junior officers yearly, and monitors the careers of these officers for their first three tours. The normal pattern is two tours overseas of two years each followed by a tour in Washington. If the officer's first assignment is to a large post, an effort is made to assign him to a small post for his next assignment. The Foreign Service also attempts to have his second assignment be to a different geographic area than the first.

We believe that the other directorates should carefully examine the pattern developed by the Foreign Service

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and the Support Services. We do not advocate hand holding, but monitoring the careers of CTs helps prevent the CT from getting lost in an office or division of a directorate and ensures that his assignments are comparable for promotion purposes with his classmates.

CTs who enter the Directorate of Intelligence are assigned to an office, usually OCI, DCS or ORR. That office then becomes responsible for the development of the CT, who acquires the career designation of the office after leaving the rolls of OTR. The administrative office of the DDI assumes no further active responsibility for the CT. The disadvantage to this approach is that the CT who may not be doing well in a particular office, or who has advanced as far as he can in that office, must depend on his own initiative or that of his supervisor to try to place him in another office.

In the Clandestine Services there is only a minimum of monitoring of CT careers above the division level. His desk work, additional training, overseas assignments, and Headquarters assignments are primarily a division responsibility. Operational Services appears to exercise only a minor role in these personnel functions.

We believe that the first several years of a CT's career are too critical to be left almost entirely to any one division or staff. If the DDP does not consider a central monitoring of CTs to be feasible, we believe that


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In our interviews with senior operating officials in the Clandestine Services, we found a considerable variety of opinions concerning early assignments of CTs. On only one point was there agreement. This was the desirability of assigning CTs overseas after twelve to eighteen months of desk work. But on the number of overseas tours and

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Promotions

In reviewing promotions of CTs, we have identified three major problem areas. The first two, the grades at which CTs enter on duty and slowness in promotion to GS-11, we have discussed under our section on Recruiting. We recommended that the DDS consider giving higher grades to CTs when they join the Agency and pointed out the desirability of CTs reaching GS-11, which has an adequate subsistence wage for a CT and his family, in a reasonable time period.

The third problem area is that of the CT's mid-career, when he is a GS-12 or -13. About one-third of the 824 CTs assigned to Agency components are GS-12s and -13s. When they become GS-13s they join the Agency's 600 other GS-13s who have only a slight opportunity of advancing to GS-14 because of lack of headroom. The situation of the GS-13 CTs will soon become known to CTs in the GS-9 and -10 grades who have just been assigned to operating components. This can have only an adverse effect on morale of the younger CTs and, in some cases, will lead to resignations. During our survey several CTs, recently assigned to components, expressed doubts to us about their future, not just based on promotions, but in terms of acquiring responsibility. One of the CT resignees we interviewed left because of these reasons.

CTs do not join CIA to make a lot of money. They apply for the Agency because they think they will like intelligence and are service-oriented. Also, they are seeking a challenge and a chance to use their innate and acquired skills. At the same time, however, they have families to support and must give practical consideration to the development of their careers.

The capable CT probably would have a more successful career as far as promotion and early assumption of responsibilities are concerned if he entered government through the Federal Government Management Intern Program, which in 1966 hired 417 Management Interns.

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Applicants who pass the required Intern exam become GS-7s or -9s as do our CTs. However, their promotion rates are rapid and their average grades are higher than CTs in operating components. One CT resigned to participate in the Management Intern Program.

The FBI starts its new agents, mostly lawyers and accountants, as GS-10s. First promotions of agents come faster than do CTs. If their performance is satisfactory, they may be promoted to GS-11 in 1-1/2 years and to GS-12 three years later. The maturity and educational backgrounds of many of our CTs are comparable to FBI agents.

All professional trainees in the federal government do not, of course, move as rapidly as Management Interns and FBI agents. In the Foreign Service, for example, promotions in the lower grades are slower. It takes about three years to move from the equivalent of GS-7 to GS-9, but promotions come with regularity in mid-career and a capable FSO can look forward to being an FSO-2, which is between a GS-15 and a GS-16, in about 21 years.

Studies now being prepared by the Office of Personnel on the scope of Agency losses among management and professional personnel during the next decade may lead to personnel action to relieve the GS-13 bulge. Thus, future attrition and retirement appear to be the principal solution to the problem of lack of headroom that exists today.

Perspective

Today the CT Program approaches a point in its development that requires scrutiny of the basic philosophy on which the program was established. The original concept of obtaining for the Agency a small number of highly qualified young intelligence officers still governs the CT Program. But with its expansion there is a developing opinion that now considers the CT Program the major source for procuring young general intelligence officers to

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meet the expanding requirements of the Agency. The Program Memorandum on Program-Wide CT training prepared by the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting based on projections made by the Support Services shows 275 CT positions for FY 1967. This number is increased yearly until by FY 1972 the figure is 325.

The Office of Personnel is studying the impact that retirement of senior personnel over the next five to ten years will have on future personnel needs. One current estimate is that as many as 400 CTs would have to enter on duty each year to replace officers who will be retiring. If such a quota were established and filled, the CT Program could not continue as it was originally conceived. It would become instead a system for recruiting, selecting, and training young generalist intelligence officers to meet the Agency's needs for professional personnel.

25X1A A long lead time is needed to recruit and train CTs. For the Clandestine Services this lead time could easily [REDACTED] is maintained. We believe, therefore, that the Office of Personnel and the Office of Training should prepare as soon as possible long-range quotas for the CT Program based on the latest available studies on the impact of retirement.

In view of the demonstrated effectiveness of the CT Program in meeting already-expanded requirements, we conclude that the Agency's interests would be best served by using the CT Program as the basic mechanism for fulfilling the Agency's growing need for young professionals.

It is recommended that:

No. 33

The Deputy Director for Support, upon the completion of the studies on the impact of retirement on the Agency, consider requesting a temporary increase in the table of organization of the Career Training Program to meet retirement losses anticipated in the next five to ten years to avoid last-minute crash recruiting programs.

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